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I. INTRODUCTION 
Final orders, judgments and decrees of a bankruptcy court may not be 
appealed directly to the circuit court of appeals but must first go through 
an intermediate appellate stage. Until recently, the Ninth Circuit was 
alone in using bankruptcy appellate panels (BAPs) to provide an 
intermediate level of review between the bankruptcy trial court and the 
circuit court of appeals. In all other circuits (except briefly in the First 
Circuit) the route to circuit court review lay through the district court. 
Now, however, BAPs have expanded into the First, Second, Sixth, 
Eighth and Tenth Circuits.1 Controversy attends the BAPs. Specifical-
ly, the expansion will likely inflame a long-standing quarrel over the 
precedential value of BAP decisions. This paper addresses that issue and 
proposes a solution which addresses the concerns of all sides. 
BAPs are strange courts. They shake up the normal hierarchical 
structure dear to many attorneys' hearts. At first glance, they look like 
circuit courts of appeals: they hear appeals, sit in panels of three, review 
findings of fact for clear error only, and focus on a de novo review of 
the law. But look again and they take on aspects of a district court: they 
serve the same intermediate appeal function in the bankruptcy appeals 
process as district courts and are themselves subject to review by the 
circuit court. On yet a third examination they appear clearly subordinate 
to the district courts: not only do the district judges decide whether to 
allow BAPs in their districts at all, but BAPs are composed of Article 
I bankruptcy judges who are by statute mere "units" of the district courts 
1. Per a LEXIS search, in 1997 the First Circuit BAP issued 19 opinions, the 
Second and Tenth Circuit BAPS each issued 13 opinions, and the Sixth and Eighth 
Circuit BAPs each issued 32 opinions. Note that not all decisions reported on LEXIS 
are considered published. 
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and who, for better or worse, are typically seen as "inferior" to Article 
III judges in the judicial hierarchy. 
This multifariousness of status and function has contributed to multiple 
views of how BAP opinions should be received by other courts. Courts 
are sharply divided over the extent to which principles of stare decisis 
should apply to BAP decisions. Most say that BAP decisions are 
binding precedent on all bankruptcy courts within a circuit.2 However, 
some say that BAP decisions do not bind any bankruptcy court.3 Still 
others attempt a compromise and say that BAP decisions bind some but 
not all bankruptcy courts.4 
Bankruptcy judges are not the only ones who disagree on this issue. 
The ink of commentators also spills in all directions.5 Add to this 
confusion the questions of what effect BAP opinions should have on 
district courts and circuit courts, and one can easily understand why the 
2. E.g., Muskin v. Industrial Steel (In Re Muskin), 151 B.R. 252 (Bankr. N.D. 
Cal. 1993) (Jaroslovsky, J.); In re Thunderbird Inn, 151 B.R. 224 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1993) 
(Nielsen, J.); Coyne v. Westinghouse Credit Corp. (In re Globe Illumination), 149 B.R. 
614 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1993) (Bufford, J.); In re General Associate Investors Ltd., 150 
B.R. 756 (Bankr. D. Ariz.) (Mooreman, J.); Philadelphia Life Ins. v. Proudfoot (In re 
Proudfoot), 144 B.R. 876 (B.A.P. 9th Cir 1992) .(Jones, Russell, Ashland, JJ. writing per 
curiam); In re Windmill Farms, 70 B.R. 618 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1987) (Mooreman, 
Ashland, Elliot, JJ.), rev'd on other grounds 841 F.2d 1467 (9th Cir. 1988). 
3. E.g., In re Standard Brands Paint, 154 B.R. 563 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1993) 
(March, J.); In re Rheuban, 128 B.R. 551 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991) (Zurzado, J.). 
4. E.g., Oregon Higher Educ. Assistance Found. v. Selden (In re Selden), 121 
B.R. 59, 62 (D. Ore. 1990) (BAP decisions bind only those bankruptcy courts sitting in 
the district out of which the appeal arose); see also In re Junes, 76 B.R. 795 (Bankr. D. 
Or. 1987) (Hess, J.), aff'd on other grounds, 99 B.R. 978 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1989) 
(Mooreman, Ashland, Jones, JJ.). 
5. Kathleen P. March & Rigoberto V. Obregon, Are BAP Decisions Binding on 
Any Court?, 18 CAL. BANKR. J. 189 (1990) (neither BAP nor district court decisions 
should bind any court); Paul M. Baisier & David G. Epstein, Resolving Still Unresolved 
Issues of Bankruptcy Law: A Fence or An Ambulance, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 525, 529-32 
(1995) (same); cf Daniel J. Bussel, Power, Authority, and Precedent in Interpreting the 
Bankruptcy Code, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1063 (1994) (both BAP and district court decisions 
should bind bankruptcy courts); cf Jeffrey J. Brookner, Note, Bankruptcy Courts and 
Stare Decisis: The Need for Restructuring, 27 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 313 (1993) (BAP 
decisions should bind bankruptcy courts but district court decisions should not); see also 
David A. Levin, Note, Precedent and the Assertion of Bankruptcy Court Autonomy: 
Efficient or Arrogant?, 12 BANKR. DEV. J. 185 (1995); cf Gordon Bermant & Judy B. 
Sloan, Bankruptcy Appellate Panels: The Ninth Circuit's Experience, 21 ARIZ. STATE 
L.J. 181 (1989) (empirical study concludes that as matter of fact BAP opinions are 
accorded great respect by attorneys and judges). 
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National Bankruptcy Review Commission (NBRC) has proposed to 
eliminate this court of many guises.6 
When one studies the matter it becomes easy to understand the 
profusion of plausible positions: the question of a BAP decision's 
precedential effect involves the interplay of both the judicial doctrine of 
stare decisis and the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. 
Separately, these doctrines lead in opposite directions. The principles of 
stare decisis support treating BAP decisions as binding precedent akin 
to circuit court opinions, but the principles of separation of powers cut 
against such treatment. Unless these doctrines can be blended, the 
question will continue to confound. Although one way around the 
problem is to abandon the BAPs as the NBRC proposes, I shall argue 
that the BAPs serve a valuable purpose and should be retained. Building 
upon insights contained in Judge Bufford's imaginative opinion in In re 
Globe Illumination,7 I suggest that the BAPs can be integrated into the 
traditional hierarchical appellate structure so as to reconcile the 
competing concerns underlying these two doctrines without requiring one 
to yield to the other. 
Part I will explain how the current structure of the bankruptcy 
appellate system should be understood in terms of the history behind the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and the constitutional concerns 
articulated by the Supreme Court in the Marathon Pipe Line case. 8 Part 
II will examine the doctrine of stare decisis and will explore the policies 
and principles which support the doctrine, as well as those which 
undercut it. Part III will first demonstrate that, solely because of the 
principles, behind stare decisis, BAP decisions should bind both 
bankruptcy and district courts within a circuit. Part III will then show 
why this result is not violative of the concerns about constitutional 
separation' of powers which underlay Marathon and subsequent 
decisions. Finally, Part IV will argue against the abandonment of the 
BAPs currently proposed by the NBRC. Instead, I suggest an appellate 
structure which will, whether Congress gives bankruptcy judges Article 
III status or not, eliminate the existing intermediate level of review, and 
at the same time preserve the valuable and unique contributions BAPs 
can make to the development of a uniform national bankruptcy law. 
6. Bankruptcy: The Next Twenty Years, National Bankruptcy Review Conunis-
sion Final Report, October 20, 1997, Ch. 3.1.3 at 752-67 (hereinafter NBRC Final 
Report). 
7. 149 B.R. 614 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1993). 
8. Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 
(1982) [hereinafter Marathon]. 
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II. CURRENT STRUCTURE AND UNDERLYING 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS 
Currently, 28 U.S.C. § 151 establishes bankruptcy courts as "a unit of 
the district court to be known as the bankruptcy court for that district." 
This statute does not, however, confer jurisdiction. Bankruptcy 
jurisdiction is vested in the district courts by 28 U.S.C. § 1334. The 
district courts are in turn permitted by 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) to refer all 
bankruptcy matters to the bankruptcy courts. It is in this indirect way 
that bankruptcy courts acquire their jurisdiction. Over matters within 
their jurisdiction, bankruptcy courts have the power to adjudicate and to 
order parties to act on the matters adjudicated.9 Final orders, judgments 
and decrees of the bankruptcy courts may not be appealed directly to the 
circuit court of appeals but must first be appealed either to a district 
court or, in certain circumstances, to a BAP. 10 
Those circumstances are set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 158. Two conditions 
must be satisfied before an appeal which would otherwise go to the 
district court may be taken to a BAP. First, the BAP must be created. 
Section 158(b)(l) provides that "the judicial council of a circuit shall 
establish" BAPs and appoint bankruptcy judges to them, unless the 
council determines that there are not enough resources or that BAPs 
would cause too· much delay. Second, the district judges must approve. 
Section 158(b)(6) provides that appeals may not be heard by BAPs in 
any given district unless a majority of judges in that district vote to 
authorize such appeals. Once these two conditions are met, sec-
tion 158(c) provides that appeals must go to a BAP unless any party to 
an appeal, within 30 days of the notice of appeal, elects to have the 
appeal heard by the district court. If this "opt out" election is made, 
then the appeal will be heard by the district court. Finally, sec-
tion 158(d) provides that appeals from either the BAPs or the district 
courts made be heard 'by the circuit courts of appeals. 
9. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (banlauptcy courts "may enter appropriate orders and 
judgments"). See also 11 U.S.C. § 105 (bankruptcy courts may "issue any order, 
process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this 
title"). 
10. 11 U.S.C. § 158. A tangle of cases address the issue of what constitutes an 
appealable final order, judgment or decree. Unraveling them, however, is beyond the 
ambit of this paper. 
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What role BAPs and their opinions should play in the bankruptcy 
judicial structure cannot be fully explored without some understanding 
of how they came to be and how they were restructured in response to 
the Supreme Court's decision in Marathon. 11 This section will explain 
(A) how the BAPs were first created, (B) how the constitutional 
concerns articulated in Marathon affected the BAPs, and (C) how the 
Congressional response to the Marathon decision critically changed the 
BAP structure. 
A. Birth of the BAPs 
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 ("BRA"),12 was not the first 
exercise of Congress' powers under Article I § 8 of the Constitution "to 
establish ... uniform Laws of the subject of Bankruptcies through the 
United States." However, the BRA accomplished so many reforms of 
such significance that, rather than merely amend the statutory scheme 
created by the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, Congress replaced it entirely with 
a new statutory scheme known as the Bankruptcy Code. 13 Two of the 
concerns which lay behind the enactment of the BRA are particularly 
relevant to the creation of the BAPs. The House floor manager of the 
BRA and its most tireless advocate, Representative Don Edwards (D-
Cal.), described them this way: 
[T]he years of study that lead to the passage of the 1978 bankruptcy law made 
clear that the two major failings of the prior bankruptcy referee system were the 
lack of simplicity in determining jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and the 
low status and lack of power of the bankruptcy judges which resulted in 
disrespect for their position and inability to attract the best caliber judges.14 
I shall explain each concern in turn. First, one of the most serious 
inadequacies of the old Bankruptcy Act was that it did not give either 
the district courts or, through them, the referees, the authority they 
needed to handle all the issues affecting the bankruptcy. The problem 
was that the court's jurisdiction was in rem, that is, based on notions of 
jurisdiction over property. Thus, the district court's bankruptcy 
jurisdiction extended only to controversies involving property in the 
actual or constructive possession of the court-so called "summary 
jurisdiction." The district court could exercise jurisdiction over other, 
"plenary" matters, such as disputes involving property in the possession 
11. See supra note 8. 
12. P.L. 95-958, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978). 
13. See generally, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787-6573; COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (15th 
ed.) App. 2 (Legislative History). 
14. 130 CONG. REC. H7490 (daily ed. June 29, 1984). 
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of third persons, only if all parties consented. Endless litigation of the 
distinction between "summary" and "plenary" had generated much heat 
but little light. As a result, significant amounts of judicial and litigant 
resources were being spent on purely jurisdictional questions. 15 
To cure this weakness, the Bankruptcy Reform Act attempted to 
replace the idea of a bifurcated in rem jurisdiction with an unitary all-
encompassing jurisdiction. "Actions that formerly had to be tried in 
State court or in Federal district court, at great cost and delay to the 
estate, may now be tried in the bankruptcy courts .... The bankruptcy 
court is given in personam jurisdiction as well as in rem jurisdiction to 
handle everything that arises in a bankruptcy case."16 There was little 
controversy over this reform and the statute as enacted was very similar 
to all of the proposed versions in both the House and Senate. To match 
this extraordinary expansion of bankruptcy court jurisdiction, the BRA 
explicitly granted bankruptcy courts all "the powers of a court of equity, 
law and admiralty."17 
The second subject of concern, the status of the bankruptcy judges, 
caused far more difficulty. Under the old 1898 Bankruptcy Act, district 
courts were denominated as bankruptcy courts as well as courts of 
general Federal jurisdiction, and had initial jurisdiction over bankruptcy 
cases. They were permitted to refer these cases to bankruptcy "referees." 
As appointees of the judges of the district court, like magistrates, 
bankruptcy referees were subordinate judicial officers of the bankruptcy 
c.ourt. Bankruptcy reformers objected to this structure because under it 
"the bankruptcy court [] is not truly and completely a court. It is not 
independent. It must operate under the supervision of an unconcerned 
district court."18 The reformers suggested that if bankruptcy referees 
were given the power and prestige of true judges, then bankruptcy cases 
would be better managed and the bankruptcy bench would attract better 
qualified people. 19 Accordingly, many argued that bankruptcy judges 
should be appointed as Article III judges which would protect their 
independence by giving them life tenure with no possibility of reduction 
15. See Report of the Commission of the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, 
H.R. Doc. No. 95-137 at 89-92 (1973). 
16. Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 445 (1977) 
(emphasis added) [hereinafter H.R. REP. 95-595]. 
17. 28 u.s.c. § 1481. 
18. H.R. REP. 95-595, supra note 16, at 4. 
19. Id. 
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in salary. Making the new bankruptcy courts Article III courts was 
especially important, the reformers argued, because of the extensive 
jurisdiction and broad powers being newly granted them. Others 
responded, however, that the status of bankruptcy judges could be raised 
sufficiently without having to go that far and that bankruptcy judges 
should be given a limited tenure and be subject to the Federal Salary 
Act.20 
The House was the first to produce a bill. H.R. 8200, proposed on 
February 1, 1978, would have created a new bankruptcy court, separate 
and distinct from the district courts, pursuant to Congress' powers under 
Article III. This action would have transformed the previously inferior 
referees into Article III bankruptcy judges.21 
The Senate's bill, S. 2266, did not grant bankruptcy judges Article III 
status. The Senate's approach to the problem of inferior status was to 
make bankruptcy courts "of record," independent from (though still 
"adjunct" to) district courts and to provide that bankruptcy judges be 
appointed by the circuit judicial council for twelve-year terms, rather 
than by the district judges for six-year terms as the Bankruptcy Act had 
provided. The Senate sponsor of the bill, Senator DeConcini, asserted 
that these measures, added to the broad grant of powers to the bankrupt-
cy court over matters within its jurisdiction, would be enough to make 
the bankruptcy judges "functionally independent of the Federal district 
courts,"22 and would "[elevate them] to a status far above that of the 
present referee."23 When it received H.R. 8200, the Senate amended 
it by substituting its bill for the House bill in full and approved H.R. 
8200, as amended, on September 7, 1978. 
In response to the Senate's proposal, the House retreated from the idea 
of making bankruptcy courts Article III courts, but rather than accept the 
Senate's bill, it proposed a compromise. Bankruptcy courts would be 
established as adjuncts to the circuit courts. Bankruptcy judges would 
have fixed 14-year tenures, and they would be appointed by the 
President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Original bankrupt- 
20. 2 U.S.C. § 351-60. The Judicial Conference of the United States was among 
those strenuously opposed to giving Article III status to bankruptcy judges. Kenneth N. 
Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Law, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 941, 947-48 
(1979). 
21. See H.R. REP. 95-595, supra note 16, at 15-31, 432-35. Another contributing 
cause to the low status of bankruptcy referees addressed by the bill was the conflation 
of judicial and administrative duties in the referees under the old 1898 Act. The bill 
proposed to separate the two functions by creating the office of the U.S. Trustee to 
administer bankruptcy cases, but leaving the judicial functions to bankruptcy judges. 
22. 124 CONG. REC. Sl4,719 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1978). 
23. 124 CONG. REC. S17,404 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978). 
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cy jurisdiction was to be vested in the circuit courts, but under the 
proposed statute bankruptcy courts would be empowered to exercise all 
of the judicial functions flowing from that grant of jurisdiction.24 
It was at this point in the legislative process that the BAPs first 
appeared. In keeping with the idea that the bankruptcy courts should be 
"adjuncts" to the circuit courts, the House bill provided that: 
[i]f the circuit council of a circuit orders application of this section to a district 
within such circuit, the chief judge of each circuit shall designate panels of 
three bankruptcy judges to hear appeals from judgments, orders, and decrees of 
the bankruptcy court of the United States for such district. Except as provided 
in section 293(e) of this title, a panel shall be composed only of bankruptcy 
judges for districts located in the circuit in which the appeal arises. The chief 
judge shall designate a sufficient number of such panels so that appeals may be 
heard and disposed of expeditiously. 
The House's proposed compromise was passed (as yet another 
wholesale amendment of H.R. 8200) and the bill was returned to the 
Senate on October 1, 1978. However, "[a]t that point, the Chief Justice 
of the United States personally intervened in an attempt to thwart 
passage of the bankruptcy legislation."25 He opposed the compromise 
idea of making bankruptcy courts adjuncts of the circuit courts.26 
Following his intervention the Senate rejected the proposed compromise 
and reinstated its initial proposal of making the bankruptcy courts 
adjuncts of the district courts. However, the Senate left the BAP 
provision untouched and left the bankruptcy judges to be appointed by 
the President, instead of the circuit. On October 6, 1978, the Senate 
returned the bill to the House with a "take it or leave it" ultimatum. 
Time was now a critical factor. The end of the ninety-fifth session of 
Congress loomed and if the bill was not enacted by then, it would have 
to start over in committee when the ninety-sixth Congress convened. In 
the face of this pressure, the bill's managers in the House accepted the 
Senate's ultimatum and the Senate's version was approved by the House 
on October 6, 1978.27 
Thus, as finally enacted the BRA created a new bankruptcy court 
whose judges (1) were appointed by the President but removable by a 
majority vote of the judicial council for the circuit, and (2) did not have 
24. See generally 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY§ 1.03 at 1-50 to -59. 
25. Klee, supra note 20, at 954. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. The statutes created by the bill are codified at 28 U.S.C. § 151-58. 
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life tenure and were not protected from reductions in salary. These 
judges were then given the broadest possible jurisdiction over all matters 
relating to bankruptcy cases through a "legislative sleight-of-hand."28 
The BRA also created the BAPs,29 and endowed them with appellate 
jurisdiction.30 Individual bankruptcy courts at the trial level were 
clearly intended to be adjuncts to the district courts. But BAPs could 
legitimately be viewed as adjuncts to the circuit courts of appeals 
because they had been created as part of the House proposal to make all 
bankruptcy courts adjuncts of the circuit courts and their status had not 
been altered in the legislative end-game. Indeed, that was the view 
adopted by the only Circuit Court to consider the question.31 Nothing 
in the floor debates or committee reports sheds light on this peculiarity; 
nothing in those sources explains either why the BAPs were included in 
the penultimate House proposal or why they were retained in the final 
Senate version. However, an explanation can be inferred from the 1973 
report of the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, 
which Congress had formed in 1970 to study the bankruptcy system and 
propose reforms. The Commission expressed a strong concern that, on 
the one hand: 
[t]he review of a referee's order by a single district judge, who is primarily a 
trial court judge, is anomalous. In most state court systems, as well as 
elsewhere in the federal judiciary, a judge's rulings can ordinarily be reviewed 
only by a court consisting of three or more judges.32 
On the other hand, "[p ]roposals to the Commission that review of 
bankruptcy court rulings be routed to the courts of appeals without going 
through the district courts were considered and rejected. The remoteness 
of the courts of appeals for large numbers of potential appellants would 
be a substantial deterrent to appeals."33 The creation of BAPs resolved 
28. Marathon Pipeline v. Northern Pipeline, 12 B.R. 946, 948, n.4 (D. Minn. 1981) 
(Lord, J.), aff' d Marathon, supra note 8. The language conferring jurisdiction was found 
in 28 U.S.C. § 1471. The description of the legislature's action appears in Marathon 
Pipeline. The scheme worked this way: Section 147l(a) vested in the district courts 
"original [i.e. trial] and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases under title 11." Section 
1471(b) vested in the district courts "original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil 
proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to cases under title 11." 
Congress then turned around in§ 1471(c) and required that the bankruptcy courts "shall 
exercise all of the jurisdiction conferred ... on the district courts." See l COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY § 3.01 (15th ed.) (emphasis added). 
29. 28 u.s.c. § 160. 
30. 28 u.s.c. § 1482. 
31. Briney v. Burley (In re Burley), 738 F.2d 981, 986 (9th Cir. 1984). 
32. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED 
STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, at 96 (1973). 
33. Id. at 97. 
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these competing concerns by providing a three-judge appellate panel for 
review of a single judge's actions in a more accessible forum to litigants 
than the federal court of appeals. 
B. The Constitutional Concern and Marathon 
On March 8, 1979, the Northern Pipeline Construction Company 
(Northern) sued the Marathon Pipe Line Company (Marathon) in federal 
district court in Kentucky, alleging breach of contract and invoking the 
diversity jurisdiction of the federal court. In January 1980, while the 
Kentucky case was pending, Northern filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
petition in Minnesota. In March 1980, in the context of the Minnesota 
filing, Northern initiated an adversary proceeding against Marathon, 
raising the same breach of contract claim it had sued on in Kentucky. 
Because the breach of contract claim was governed by Kentucky law, 
Marathon argued from the beginning that the bankruptcy court lacked 
jurisdiction. A federal court's adjudication of a state law claim would 
be an exercise of the judicial power of the United States. That power 
could be exercised only by tenured judges appointed under Article III of 
the Constitution. 
The constitutional concern raised by Marathon is typically termed the 
"separation of powers" doctrine. In brief, those who wrote the 
Constitution thought that governmental powers could be best divided 
into three "inherently distinct" types: legislative, executive and judi-
cial.34 What the Framers sought to avoid was "[t]he accumulation of 
all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, 
whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, 
or elective."35 Such an accumulation would "justly be pronounced the 
very definition of tyranny."36 The Constitution, therefore, created three 
departments or Branches, one for each of the three powers. "The 
Framers regarded the checks and balances that they had built into the 
tripartite Federal Government as a self-executing safeguard against the 
encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the 
other."37 
34. Marathon, supra note 8, at 57. 
35. Id. (quoting frorn THE FEDERALIST No. 47). 
36. Id. 
37. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976). 
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To make the Judicial Department an effective check upon the other 
branches, the Framers required in Article III that judges be given (1) life 
tenure (subject only to impeachment) and (2) irreducible salaries. Any 
tribunal Congress created to exercise the functions assigned to the 
Judicial Department which did not have those two characteristics would 
be too vulnerable to pressure from the Legislative Department to be truly 
independent and would thus constitute an accumulation of the judicial 
power in the Legislature-the very definition of tyranny. 38 
The BRA violated the Constitution, Marathon argued, because 
Congress had created a tribunal (the bankruptcy court) with extensive 
power to perform judicial functions, but had not given the judges of that 
tribunal the two protections of Article III that would have made them 
truly members of an independent branch of government. Instead, 
Congress had used its powers under Article.I to create nothing more than 
an extension of itself, the Legislative Department. 
The Government offered two arguments for the statute's constitutional-
ity. First, it claimed that Congress had the power to establish non-
Article III courts to hear bankruptcy matters because Article I gave 
Congress the exclusive power to write bankruptcy laws. Second, and in 
the alternative, it asserted that bankruptcy matters were in fact decided 
by Article III courts because bankruptcy court decisions were reviewable 
by the district courts and circuit courts. 
The Supreme Court agreed with Marathon and rejected both of the 
Government's arguments. It struck down 28 U.S.C. § 1471 as an 
usurpation by the Legislative Department of those powers which could 
only be exercised by the Judicial Department under Article III.39 The 
Court's decision was the product of a four-justice plurality (Brennan, 
Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun) and a two-justice concurrence 
(Rehnquist and O'Connor). In rejecting of the Government's first 
argument, the plurality recognized that there were circumstances under 
which Congress could create Article I courts, but decided that none of 
those circumstances applied to adjudication of matters under the 
bankruptcy laws. Therefore, 28 U.S.C. § 1741 was, on its face, 
unconstitutional. 
Writing for himself and Justice O'Connor, Justice Rehnquist also 
rejected the Government's first argument but refused to go as far as the 
plurality in his reasoning. He thought the issue was much narrower than 
whether the entire scope of jurisdiction granted in 28 U.S.C. § 1471 
violated Article III of the Constitution. The case involved only the 
38. Marathon, supra note 8, at 57. 
39. Id. at 76-87. 
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attempted exercise by the bankruptcy court of its jurisdiction over a state 
law claim that would otherwise be heard by an Article III federal district 
court under its diversity jurisdiction. "To whatever extent different 
powers granted [the bankruptcy courts] might be sustained . . . I am 
satisfied that the adjudication of Northern's lawsuit cannot be so 
sustained. "40 Rehnquist refused to be drawn into the debate between 
the plurality and the dissent over just how far Congress could go in 
vesting non-Article III courts with jurisdiction to adjudicate cases and 
controversies. However, he thought that the jurisdiction to adjudicate 
state law claims was so mixed in with the rest of the jurisdiction granted 
by 28 U.S.C. § 1741 as to be nonseverable, and that therefore the entire 
provision must fall. 
The second Government argument was also rejected by both the 
plurality and the concurrence. The mere ability to appeal to an Article 
III tribunal would not satisfy the constitutional scheme, the plurality 
wrote, because: 
[ o ]ur precedents make it clear that the constitutional requirements for the 
exercise of the judicial power must be met at all stages of adjudication, and not 
only on appeal, where the court is restricted to considerations of law, as well 
as the nature of the case as it has been shaped at the trial level. The Court 
responded to a similar suggestion in Crowell by stating that to accept such a 
regime, 'would be to sap the judicial power as it exists under the Federal 
Constitution and to establish a government of bureaucratic character alien to our 
system, wherever fundamental rights depend, as not infrequently they do 
depend, upon the facts, and finality as to the facts becomes in effect finality in 
law.' 285 U.S. at 57.41 
Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor agreed that "the extent ofreview by 
Art. III provided on appeal from a decision of the bankruptcy court in 
a case such as Northern's does not save the grant of authority to the 
latter under the rule espoused in Crowell v. Benson . ... "42 
Neither the Marathon plurality, concurrence nor dissent discussed the 
BAPs, except to note their existence in passing. As the Ninth Circuit 
later noted, "Marathon did not discuss what role a non-Article III officer 
could play in the appellate process or, more specifically, whether the role 
40. Id. at 89 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
41. Marathon, supra note 8, at 86 n.39 (quoting from Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 
22 (1932)). 
42. Marathon, supra note 8, at 91. 
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of the BAP is consistent with Article III."43 Specifically, although the 
Court had clearly struck down 28 U.S.C. § 1471, which gave bankruptcy 
courts trial jurisdiction, it was unclear whether the Court's holding or 
logic extended to 28 U.S.C. § 1482, the statute granting jurisdiction to 
the BAPs. The courts of the First and Ninth Circuits, the only two 
circuits which had established BAPs under the BRA, agreed that the 
Supreme Court had not considered the BAP statute, but came to opposite 
conclusions on their own analysis as to whether that statute was 
constitutional. 
The First Circuit BAP was the first court to consider the continued 
viability of the BAPs after Marathon. In Massachusetts v. Dartmouth 
House Nursing Home,44 the court noted that Marathon "did not declare 
section 1482 unconstitutional,"45 but independently concluded that its 
own existence was unconstitutional. This BAP noted that its jurisdiction 
was to hear all appeals from the bankruptcy courts and the jurisdiction 
of those courts was flawed. The court then reasoned: "It is obvious that 
if Congress cannot constitutionally establish non-Article III courts to 
exercise jurisdiction over the wide range of issues encompassed by 
section 1471 at the trial level, then it cannot establish non-Article III 
courts to hear the same issues at the appellate level."46 The First 
Circuit itself did not reach the constitutional question, finding instead 
that the emergency rule governing bankruptcy procedure in the circuit 
had effectively repealed authorization for the BAPs.47 
The unconstitutionality of the BAPs was, however, far from "obvious" 
to the Ninth Circuit. It concluded that "the continued functioning of the 
BAP is consistent with Article III and the Marathon decision."48 The 
Ninth Circuit thought the Dartmouth House reasoning had 
omitted an important step. Marathon stated that non-Article III officers may 
constitutionally perform judicial functions so long as an Article III judge retains 
the essential attributes of the judicial power. The role of the BAP in the 
43. Briney v. Burley (In re Burley), 738 F.2d 981, 985 (9th Cir. 1984). 
44. In re Dartmouth House Nursing Home 30 B.R. 56. (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1983), aff'd 
on other grounds 726 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1984). 
45. Id. at 58. 
46. Id. at 62. 
41. In re Dartmouth House Nursing Home, 726 F.2d at 28-30. Marathon was 
decided on June 28, 1982. However, out of concern for the massive disruption that it 
would cause the bankruptcy system, the Supreme Court did not apply its decision 
retroactively. Instead, the Court stayed its mandate-eventually until December 24, 
1982-to give time for responsive measures to be taken before bankruptcy courts lost 
their jurisdiction. By that time, each circuit had promulgated emergency rules to govern 
bankruptcy procedure until such time as Congress enacted new legislation. · 
48. Briney v. Burley (In re Burley), 738 F.2d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 1984). 
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appellate process is constitutional because the court of appeals retains those 
essential attributes.49 
The Ninth Circuit noted that the fatal flaw in the bankruptcy court 
jurisdictional scheme appeared to be that too much power and jurisdic-
tion had been granted to the bankruptcy "adjuncts," and too little 
supervisory authority had been left in the district courts. That problem 
did not exist with the BAPs because unlike the district court, in its 
relationship to the trial level bankruptcy court, the court of appeals, in 
its relationship with the BAP, retained all of the essential attributes of 
the judicial power. First, the power to make the final determination of 
all questions remained with the court of appeals, because it reviewed 
BAP decisions de novo. This was far different from the highly 
deferential standard of review of the district court over bankruptcy 
courts' findings of fact, the aspect of the district court/bankruptcy court 
relationship that so disturbed the Supreme Court. Second, the choice of 
whether or not to establish or disband the BAP rested with the circuit 
council. 50 Again, this evidenced a far greater degree of control over 
the BAP by the circuit courts than the district courts exercised over the 
individual bankruptcy court. Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded "that the 
BAP is constitutional ... as an adjunct to the court of appeals."51 
The Ninth Circuit decided In re Burley on July 3, 1984. One week 
later, on July 10, 1984, the question of the constitutionality of the BAPs 
as created by the BRA was mooted by the passage of the Bankruptcy 
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 (BAFJA). This was 
Congress' long-delayed response to Marathon. 
C. The Congressional Response to Marathon 
In the BAFJA, Congress made several important changes to the 
Bankruptcy Code. The most significant was jurisdictional. The BRA 
had attempted to unify the bifurcated "summary" and "plenary" 
bankruptcy jurisdictions into one all-encompassing jurisdictional grant, 
which was then passed on automatically to the bankruptcy courts. In 
49. Id. at 985. 
50. The court might have added here that because the BAPs were created by the 
circuit, and bankruptcy judges were removable by the circuit, the power to appoint and 
remove had been taken from the Legislative Branch and lodged in the Judicial Branch. 
51. In re Burley, 738 F.2d at 986. 
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contrast, the BAFJA resurrected the concept of two classes of jurisdic-
tion and left it to the district courts' discretion whether and what types 
of matters to refer to the bankruptcy courts, which were now "units" 
instead of "adjuncts."52 
The BAFJA did not return to the in rem distinction that the old 1898 
Bankruptcy Act had made between property in and property out of the 
court's possession; instead it introduced a distinction between "core" and 
"non-core" proceedings. As the BRA had done, the BAFJA initially 
lodged in the district courts all "original and exclusive jurisdiction over 
bankruptcy cases" and "original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil 
proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to cases under 
title 11."53 However, the BAFJA differed from the BRA in that 
bankruptcy courts could now "hear and determine" only those "proceed-
ings arising under title 11, or arising in a case under title 11" that were 
labeled "core proceedings."54 The bankruptcy court could exercise its 
full range of powers over core proceedings, including the making of 
final findings of fact, reviewable only for clear error. Proceedings that 
were merely "related to a case under title 11" but not "arising under" or 
"arising in" a case under title 11, were "non-core proceedings."55 With 
respect to those types of proceedings, a bankruptcy court had power to 
"hear" but not to "determine." Final judgment came from the district 
court, to whom the bankruptcy court had to submit proposed findings of 
fact for de nova review (unless the parties consented to give the 
bankruptcy court the power to make the final decision). 
These provisions, along with the provisions allowing (and sometimes 
requiring) the district court to withdraw the reference to the bankruptcy 
court and allowing (and sometimes requiring) federal court abstention 
from state law claims, were the chief correctives to the constitutional 
concerns articulated in Marathon. It is evident that these correctives 
addressed more the specific complaint of the concurrence than the broad 
condemnation in the plurality opinion.56 Whether these changes have 
cured the constitutional defect in the BRA has never been tested in the 
Supreme Court. Although lower courts have upheld the revised statute 
52. 28 U.S.C. § 157(a). 
53. 28 u.s.c. § 1334. 
54. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b). 
55. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c). 
56. See 130 CONG. REc. No. S8890 (1984) (remarks of Sen. Dole). Note that in 
Marathon, the diversity of the parties gave the court federal subject matter jurisdiction. 
An intriguing problem is whether Congress can, consistent with the limits on federal 
jurisdiction in Article III, grant any federal forum subject matter jurisdiction over purely 
state law issues merely because they are "related to" a bankruptcy case. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 157(c); 130 CONG. REC. Nos. S 8893-8894 (1984) (remarks of Sen. Hatch). 
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against constitutional challenges, 57 commentators are markedly split 
over the matter. 58 , . , . 
During the BAFJA legislative'process, the Ninth Circuit recommended 
to the Senate that the BAPs be retained.59 As finally enacted, the 
BAFJA did preserve BAPs, but made two critical changes, both designed 
to make the BAPs a subsidiary and voluntary alternative to the district 
courts for those wishing to appeal. It appears that Congress was 
operating on. the theory that parties could waive their right to have their 
dispute heard by an Article III court. 60 
The first change that the BAFJA made was in how BAPs were to be 
established. Although BAP judges were still appointed by the judicial 
council of the circuit (indeed, the BAFJA made the circuit courts 
responsible for appointing bankruptcy judges in general, whereas the 
BRA had lodged that power in the President), the circuit court could no 
longer simply impose BAPs on the districts, as it was able to under the 
BRA. Instead, under the new 28 U.S.C. § 158, a BAP could operate in 
a given district only if a majority of the district judges in that district 
voted for it. 
The second change was that the BAFJA required that the litigants 
consent before a BAP could hear an appeal. At first, the Ninth Circuit's 
order establishing the post-1984 BAPs provided that appeals would go 
to the district courts unless both parties agreed to have the appeal heard 
by a BAP (an "opt in" rule). It was difficult, however, to obtain 
affirmative consent from all parties to an appeal in a timely fashion. As 
a result, only three appeals had been submitted to a BAP in the first six 
months of the order's operation, while 352 appeals had gone directly to 
57, See, e.g., In re Michigan Real Estate Ins, Trust, 87 B.R. 447 (E.D. Mich. 1988) 
(vesting of jurisdiction in "units" of district court held constitutional); In re Global Int'l 
Airways, 81 B.R. 541 (W.D. Mo. 1987) (vesting of jurisdiction in bankruptcy courts to 
hear core matters held constitutional); Matter of Associated Grocers of Nebraska 
Cooperative, 62 B.R. 439 (D. Neb. 1986) (Article III not violated by grant of power to 
bankruptcy courts to avoid preferences under revised statutory scheme enacted by 
Congress after Marathon). 
58. See NBRC Final Report, supra note 6, at 732-37 . 
59. Gordon Bermant & Judy B. Sloan, Bankruptcy Appellate Panels: The Ninth 
Circuit's Experience, 21 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 181, 191 n.56 (1989). 
60. See Lawrence P. King, Jurisdiction and Procedure Under the Bankruptcy 
Amendments of 1984, 38 VAND. L. REV. 675, 685 (1985) (explaining the absence of 
legislative history and suggesting that Congress added the consent requirement out of "an 
overabundance of caution"). 
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the district courts.61 To deal with this problem, the Ninth Circuit 
changed to an "opt out" rule: appeals were routed automatically to the 
BAPs unless one party raised a timely objection. Since that change was 
made, BAPs have heard about sixty percent of appeals taken from 
bankruptcy courts . 62 
The 1994 bankruptcy amendments have expanded the BAPs' role. As 
enacted by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, 63 each circuit is now 
required to form a BAP unless the circuit concludes that there are not 
enough resources or that BAPs would cause too much delay. Nonethe-
less, it remains the rule that a BAP may operate only in a district that 
has approved it. In the Second Circuit, for example, where BAPs have 
been established, only three districts participate-and these together 
typically receive less than a third of all bankruptcy petitions filed in the 
Second Circuit.64 The new amendments also codify the Ninth Circuit's 
"opt out" rule: appeals go to the BAPs automatically in jurisdictions 
where BAPs operate, unless a party timely objects.65 
Thus have BAPs come to dwell in a jurisprudential twilight zone: they 
are mandated by law, and created by the circuit court of appeals, but 
they exist only at the sufferance of each district court, hear appeals only 
by consent of the parties, and are composed of judges who, when sitting 
as trial judges, are mere "units" of the district court. The consequent 
debate over what precedential value their opinions should be accorded 
is not surprising. What is surprising is the degree to which almost all 
the participants in that debate have assumed, without examination, that 
the doctrine of stare decisis is (1) a clear and applicable doctrine that is 
(2) desirable not only generally but specifically in bankruptcy law. The 
next section will examine each of these assumptions and explore the 
various justifications that support or undercut the doctrine generally. 
Part III will then look to see which of these justifications support 
application of the doctrine to BAP decisions. Through this 
commonsense analysis one can come to a principled conclusion about 
the extent to which BAP decisions should bind other courts. 
61. See Bermant & Sloan, supra note 59, at 192. 
62. See, e.g., 1994 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, Table S-14. 
63. P.L. 103-394 (October 22, 1994). 
64. The participating districts are Connecticut, Vermont and the Northern District 
of New York. See 1994 ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, Table F. 
65. 28 U.S.C. § 158(c). 
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Ill. THE IDEAS BEHIND STARE DECISIS 
A. Structure of the Doctrine 
The term "stare decisis" is short for the maxim "stare decisis et no 
quieta movere" which may be translated "let stand what is decided and 
do not disturb what is settled."66 The key idea behind this judicially 
created, flexible doctrine is that a judge should follow the legal rules 
used to decide a prior case that was like the pending case, even when the 
judge believes the prior decision erroneous. 67 Before delving into the 
justifications for this idea, a brief description of the doctrine's structure 
may be helpful. 
1. Strict and Lenient Stare Decisis 
The doctrine of stare decisis is· nothing if not flexible. It can bind 
with ball and chain or with rubber bands. How strictly the doctrine is 
applied varies across both space and time. While the key concept 
behind stare decisis is found in almost all legal systems, the doctrine 
itself is given uniform force neither between judicial systems nor even 
within a single judicial system over time. For example, beginning in the 
seventeenth century the British House of Lords, the court of last resort 
in Great Britain considered itself strictly bound by its own previous 
decisions.68 Then in 1966 that body decided it could, after all, modify 
or even overrule itself.69 At the other extreme, most civil law countries 
would deny that they apply stare decisis at all. That is, they claim not 
to be bound by any prior single decision.70 But they do follow the 
66. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990). 
67. This was nicely put in Paul W. Werner, Comment The Straits of Stare Decisis 
and the Utah Court of Appeals: Navigating the Scylla of Under-Application and the 
Charybdis of Over-Application, 1994 B.Y.U.L. REV. 633, 640 (1994). "When a court 
lays down a rule of law attaching a specific legal consequence to a detailed set of facts, 
the court must adhere to the legal principle it has announced by applying it in all 
subsequent cases that come before it presenting a similar factual premise." 
68. Bussel, supra note 5, at 1081 n.75. 
69. Id. Even now, the second highest court in Great Britain, the Queens Bench, 
which sits in panels much like American courts of appeal, adheres strictly to its prior 
decisions, even to the point that a panel decision will bind the court sitting en bane. 
70. "A central premise in civil law systems is that judicial decisions are not a 
source of law. It would violate the rules against judicial lawmaking if decisions of 
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same idea; they simply call it something like "looking for the trend in 
the law." As a matter of practice the courts in such countries do 
consider, respect, and give weight to other decisions.71 Though never 
as strict as British courts, nor as loose as the Continental ones, our own 
Supreme Court has vacillated over time in its adherence to the doctrine. 
In the past twenty years the Court appears to have [at least] discussed 
the doctrine more than at any other time in its history.72 
2. Horizontal and Vertical Stare Decisis 
Stare decisis is usually described in hierarchical terms: it is the 
application by a "lower" court of the decisions of a "higher" court, 
where "higher" is defined as the possession of any power to review a 
"lower" court's decision. The obvious example is the application of a
Supreme Court decision by the lower federal courts.73 This is known 
as "vertical stare decisis." However, the doctrine also has application 
between coordinate panels of a single court, or between the same court's 
previous decisions and the current case. For example, the United States 
Courts of Appeals typically sit in panels of three judges. A panel 
decision is binding on all subsequent panel decisions within the same 
circuit. Likewise, the Supreme Court's prior decisions have a stare 
decisis effect on its later cases. This application of the doctrine is 
termed "horizontal stare decisis."74 
While some judges understand both meanings of stare decisis, 75 
others confuse the general doctrine with its specific application to 
"superior" and "inferior" courts.76 Courts and commentators concerned 
with BAPs have typically devoted their analytical energies solely to the 
question whether or not a prior decision has come from a "superior" 
court. They have assumed that if a court is "superior" then obedience 
courts were to be binding on subsequent courts. Hence, no court is bound by tbe 
decision of any other court in a civil law jurisdiction." Evan Caminker, Why Must 
Inferior Court Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STANFORD L. REV. 817, 826 
(1994). 
71. Brookner, supra note 5, at 313 n.2; Bussel, supra note 5, at 1081 n.76. 
72. A LEXIS search for all Supreme Court cases in which the term "stare decisis" 
appears found 335 of them: In the past 20 years, tbere have been about 10-14 per term. 
In the 10 years prior to that, the numbers drop off sharply, to 2-4 per term, and tben, in 
the period back to 1800, the term is mentioned only every few years. 
73. Taylor Mattis, Stare Decisis Among and Within Florida's District Courts of 
Appeal, 18 FLA. STATE U. L. REV. 143, 143-44 (1990). 
74. Id. 
75. See, e.g., Life Ins. Co. of Va. v. Barakat (In re Barakat), 173 B.R. 672, 676 
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1994) (Mund, J.). 
76. For an excellent exploration of tbe range of justifications for vertical stare 
decisis, see Caminker, supra note 70. 
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is owed and that if a court is not "superior" then its decisions must not 
be binding.77 Such a slavish devotion to :hierarchy without a fair 
examination of the underlying reasons why hierarchy matters obscures 
rather than illuminates. As Professor Evan Caminker aptly warns: "[W]e 
must take care not to confuse the familiar with the necessary: The 
common law system's axiom that lower courts must obey superior court 
precedent needs justification."78 The next two sections will briefly 
review the rationales which support stare decisis, both as a general 
proposition and as principle for the operation of a hierarchical system, 
as well as those rationales which undermine it. 
B. Reasons for Stare Decisis 
There are a number of ways in which the justifications for stare decisis 
might be presented. No single justification explains the application of 
the doctrine in all circumstances or for all courts.79 I present the 
justifications in roughly the order of the frequency with which I have 
seen them articulated in cases and commentaries, with just a brief 
description of each. 
1. Stability 
One common justification for stare decisis is that it promotes stability 
in the law. Justice Brandeis' epigram is one often-quoted expression of 
this idea: "stare decisis . is usually the wise policy, because in most 
77. See, e.g., Catalona v. Holdenried (In re Holdenried), 178 B.R. 782, 786 (Bankr. 
E.D. Mo. 1995) (bankruptcy court bound by prior district court decision because "[t]his 
Court must follow the decisions of a higher court having direct appellate review"); In 
re Shattuc Cable Corp., 138 B.R. 557 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992) (stare decisis described 
only as "lower courts are bound to follow the decisions of superior courts" and therefore 
bankruptcy court not bound by prior district court decision because district court was not 
superior to bankruptcy court which was a "unit" of the district court); March & Obregon, 
supra note 5 (BAP and district court decisions should not bind any court because neither 
BAPs nor district courts are functionally superior). But see Bussel, supra note 5 
(exploring range of justifications for making both BAP and district court decisions 
binding on bankruptcy courts). 
78. Caminker, supra note 70, at 826. 
19. Id. at 817; Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Perspective on Stare Decisis, 
65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 63, 73-78 (1989). 
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matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled 
than that it be settled right. "80 
At the same time, it is recognized that stability is only a means to an 
end, not an end in itself. Stability is desirable to the extent that it can 
"furnish a clear guide for the conduct of individuals, to enable them to 
plan their affairs with assurance against untoward surprise."81 Thus, 
stare decisis tends to be of greater importance in areas of law in which 
people might rely upon a given legal rule to govern their conduct. For 
example, it is a widely accepted assumption in tort law that the level of 
care people take in performing a given activity will vary with the 
governing liability rules, so that if the rules change, so will their 
behavior. 82 Likewise, it is widely believed that parties rely upon 
known legal rules in entering into contractual relationships. 83 The 
reliance aspect of the stability rationale can, however, easily be 
overstated. "The picture of the bewildered litigant lured into a course 
of action by the false light of a decision, only to meet ruin when the 
light is extinguished and the decision overruled, is for the most part a 
figment of .excited brains."84 Certainly, the value of stability as a 
justification for stare decisis is less important in areas of law where the 
legal rule does not necessarily influence people's behavior, or where the 
legal rule may not be the only or even the primary influence on 
behavior. 85 
Nor is the value of stability uniform across time; stability loses its 
attractiveness as it becomes stagnation. If law is to be an enforcer of 
80. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas, 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). See also Vasquez v. Hillary, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986) (stare decisis ensures 
that "the law will not merely change erratically"). See also Jonathan R. Macey, The 
Internal and External Costs and Benefits of Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L: REV. 93, 
102-07 (1989) (attributing societal economic benefits of decreased error costs and 
decreased transaction costs to increased stability provided by stare decisis). 
81. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970). 
82. This idea is discussed in the context of automobile/pedestrian accidents in 
Chapter 6 of A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 37-
51 (1983), and is also discussed in Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Perspective on 
Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 63, 68-69, 82-86 (1989). 
83. E.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) ("Considerations in favor 
of stare decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights, where 
reliance interests are involved"). Contract law and tort law are not the only area where 
stare decisis is thought to be of special importance. See Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio 
Ry., 57 U.S. 314, 325 (1850) ("There are no cases, where an adherence to the maxim 
of 'stare decisis' is so absolutely necessary to the peace of society, as those which affect 
retroactively the jurisdiction of the courts"). 
84. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 122 (1924). 
85. E.g., Moragne, supra note 81, at 403-04 (allowing cause of action for 
negligence would not violate stability rationale behind stare decisis because it would 
simply "effectuate well-established rules of primary behavior"). 
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social values, it must also be a reflection of them. Thus, the concept of 
stability must include a notion of orderly change over time; too rigid an 
adherence to stare decisis may actually undermine social stability. 86 
Imagine the consequences if the Court in Brown v. Bd. of Education had 
adhered to the doctrine of separate but equal laid down in Plessey v. 
Ferguson. 
The stability rationale is invoked most often to justify vertical stare 
decisis. However, both theory and practice suggest it is also relevant to 
the justification of horizontal stare decisis between multi-judge panels. 
The theoretical relevance arises from the difficulties encountered by 
groups of people who, by voting or by some other means, must translate 
the preferences expressed by their individual members into a preference 
expressed by the whole group. Social scientists who study. collective 
decision-making-the study of social choice-assert that it is impossible 
to devise a rational method for translating individual preferences into 
group preferences.87 One phenomenon of collective decision-making, 
which social choice scholars have studied for well over 200 years, is that 
there may never be any result which can withstand shifting coalitions of 
voting blocks, even assuming (with a great leap of faith) that everyone 
involved in the decision process acts in a completely principled way. 88 
Unprincipled behavior simply exacerbates the difficulty of maintaining 
majority agreement for a given outcome.89 This problem, called 
cycling by social choice theorists, is as inevitable in a three-judge panel 
as it is in a hundred-member senate.90 A rule of stare decisis is at least 
a partial solution to the problem of cycling, because application of the 
86. Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Perspective on Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 63, 82-90 (1989) (exploring the justification for stare decisis where 
changes in society's substantive values change the socially optimal legal outcomes). 
87. See generally Maxwell L. Steams, The Misguided Renaissance of Social 
Choice, 103 YALE L. REV. 1219 (1994) (reviewing social choice literature); KENNETH 
J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d Ed. 1963). 
88. Steams, supra note 87. 
89. Id. 
90. Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social 
Choice, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1309, 1329-50 (1995) (demonstrating how cycling phenomenon 
occurs within multi-judge panels); Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 
95 HARV. L. REV. 802 (1982) (demonstrating how it is impossible for the Supreme Court 
to be consistent over time). 
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rule slows the rate at which decisions can change over time and thus 
promotes stability.91 
The practical relevance of the stability rationale to horizontal stare 
decisis is demonstrated by the experience of the Michigan intermediate 
court of appeals, which found that where multi-judge panels fail to apply 
horizontal stare decisis, the law becomes less stable.92 
2. Uniformity 
Closely related to stability is the idea that stare decisis promotes 
uniformity in the law. The debate over this justification often depends 
on which aphorism one prefers: "treat like cases alike" or "two wrongs 
don't make a right." To those concerned that each case be justified on 
its merits rather than by reference to an established rule, this justification 
for stare decisis is unpersuasive. Even for those who prefer uniform 
rules, however, there are problems with this justification. The idea of 
the first aphorism is that like cases should yield like results; equality 
before the law means equal treatment by the law. This principle sounds 
well as it trips off the tongue, but its practical application is like nailing 
Jell-O to the wall. What constitutes the relevant facts that make one 
case like another is frequently open to debate.93 Treating people fairly 
sometimes requires applying different rules, or recognizing that a given 
rule cannot be uniformly applied without injustice. For example, assume 
that a local ordinance prohibits people from sleeping in tents within the 
city limits. The application of that rule to upper -middle-class teenagers 
frolicking in the park is something quite different from the "uniform" 
application of the rule to a homeless family camped under the free-
way.94 Likewise, uniformity, like stability, can degenerate into 
stagnation. While few doubt that the law strives to be "fair" it is not 
91. Stearns, supra note 90, at 1329-50. 
92. See Taylor Mattis, Stare Decisis Within Michigan's Court of Appeals: 
Precedential Effect of Its Decisions on the Court Itself and on Michigan Trial Courts, 
37 WAYNE L. REV. 265, 285 (1991) (listing areas of confusion and conflict). 
93. One such debate occurs in the area of poverty law where scholars argue over 
what facts should be presented to an adjudicator and how they should be presented. For 
an especially lucid review and critique of the debate, see Kathy Lesser Mansfield, 
Deconstructing Reconstructive Poverty Law: A Practice-Based Critique of the 
Storytelling Aspects of the Theoretics of Practice Movement, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 889 
(1995) . 
94. Deciding what predicate facts are relevant to the invocation of stare decisis can 
also be seen as another facet of the hoary debate over rules versus standards. See, e.g., 
Jonathan R. Macey, The Internal and External Costs and Benefits of Stare Decisis, 65 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 93, 104 (1981) (advocating that judges follow the "meta-rule" 
established in prior cases rather than "some narrowly defined construction of the precise 
legal rule"). 
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always clear that uniform application of a given legal rule is the way to 
achieve faimess.95 
3. Judicial Economy and Efficiency 
Courts frequently intone the mantra that "[t]his court must follow the 
decisions of a higher court having direct appellate review,"96 and that 
"lower courts are bound to follow the decisions of superior courts."97 
It could be that these are normative statements about the value of 
hierarchy-assertions that the judges of a "superior" court must be 
obeyed because of where they sit in the hierarchy. The strong version 
of this normative claim might be that the judges of "superior" courts 
must be obeyed because they are appointed by virtue of being better 
judges than those appointed to the "inferior" court. A simple look at 
who is on the bench suffices to refute this claim; few would assert that 
Judges Richard Posner or John Minor Wisdom are in any sense inferior 
to, say, Justice Clarence Thomas. The weaker version of the normative 
claim would suggest that there is some tendency for more competent 
jurists to be appointed to the more prestigious positions. However, the 
question then becomes what value is served by pretending that all 
superior court judges are inherently smarter and wiser than inferior court 
judges. That is an even more difficult normative claim to advance than 
the strong version, for it advocates institutionalizing hypocrisy. If only 
some are better, why defer to all? And if not deferring to all, then upon 
what basis does someone (who?) decide exactly which are the better 
judges? 
It is not necessary, however, to defend the mantra as a normative 
claim. It may instead be supported by two consequentialist claims: that 
95. The debate over the proper role of the state in accommodating religious beliefs 
and actions stemming from those beliefs is another excellent example of claims that a 
rule, supposedly "neutral" because applied to all persons, is actually discriminatory 
because people attempting to exercise their religious beliefs "are different in a way that 
cannot be changed but can only be accommodated." Michael W. McConnell, Free 
Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. Cm. L. REV. 1109, 1140 (1990) 
(analogizing theory of accommodation for free exercise of religion to handicap 
discrimination where "the paradigmatic instance . . . is treating people who are 
fundamentally different as if they were the same"). 
96. Catalona v. Holdenried (In re Holdenried), 178 B.R. 782, 786 (Bankr. E.D. 
Mo. 1995). 
97. In re Shattnc Cable Corp., 138 B.R. 557, 565 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992). 
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the "path-of-review" justifies stare decisis, and that appellate courts are 
just better at getting the law right than are trial courts. I consider each 
of these claims in turn. 
The first claim is that by establishing a path of review, the principle 
of stare decisis promotes judicial economy and leads to more efficient 
decision-making. The lower court's adherence to a rule laid down by 
the appellate court saves the litigants the time and expense of appealing 
against a foregone conclusion. The lower court's obedience also 
conserves judicial resources: the resources of the appellate judiciary,98 
and its own. The ability to rely upon precedent frees the trial court from 
re-inventing the wheel or becoming expert in all areas of the law that 
come before it. 
The path-of-review rationale justifies vertical stare decisis more than 
horizontal stare decisis. It also almost proves too much. That is, it 
assumes, as the footnoted quote from Moore's demonstrates, that chaos 
would ensue without vertical stare decisis. But the very reasons for the 
rule in the first place would appear to operate to restrain trial judges as 
much as the rule itself-few people wish to reinvent the wheel or to 
learn every area of law in order to make an informed decision. Often, 
regardless of whether there is a formal rule or not, prior decisions of 
reviewing courts will be followed because that is the easiest action to 
take. Moreover, there is another, very practical, reason for lower court 
judges to obey higher court decisions. "Judges follow the decisions of 
higher courts because they know that the higher courts will reverse if 
they don't and the value of the trial court's decisions (and hence his or 
her effectiveness as a judge) will be diminished if he or she is always 
reversed. "99 
The second consequentialist claim for strong vertical stare decisis is 
that the appellate courts are inherently better decision-makers and are 
more likely than a trial court to find or establish the correct legal rule. 
This has little to do with the individual abilities of the appellate judge 
and everything to do with the structure of the appellate court. This idea 
is something more than "three heads are better than one." Since 
appellate panels are solely in the business of hearing appeals, they are 
institutionally more competent to decide them. The legal issues will 
have been defined below. The parties will brief the issues more 
98. 1B Moore's Federal Practice (2d Ed. 1990) 'I[ 0.402[1] at 10 n.14 ("unless the 
inferior courts· make a good faith effort to follow the decisions of the courts with 
jurisdiction to review their judgments, appeals would be endless"). For an exposition 
of the economic justifications for stare decisis, see Macey, supra note 80; Kornhauser, 
supra note 86. 
99. In re Muskin, 151 B.R. 252, 254 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1993) (Jaroslovsky, J.). 
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carefully than at trial, where the demands of fact-finding may absorb 
their resources. The appellate panel will likewise not be distracted by 
the trial from concentrating on the law and will have more time and 
resources to consider the law than does the trial judge. Finally, 
communication between the judges will lead to a better result since each 
judge can test the soundness of his or her reasoning against the 
others. 100 
Of course, once an issue has received the benefit of a variety of 
judicial opinions, this justification weakens. That is, a trial court may 
be able to overcome some of the disadvantages of lack of time, lack of 
proper briefing, and lack of colleagues if there are a variety of easily 
discovered decisions on point. And, indeed, one often sees in trial court 
opinions careful research and thoughtful analysis of points of law on 
which there is a great deal of controversy. 101 
4. Judicial Legitimacy 
A fourth justification for stare decisis is that it promotes two 
fundamental principles of American democracy and so protects the 
legitimacy of the judiciary. One such fundamental principle is that no 
100. Indeed, purely as a function of probability, a group of judges is more likely to 
reach the "right" result in a given case than is an individual judge, assuming that each 
judge on the panel is more likely than not to individually find the correct rule. I 
emphasize that this only works when each panel judge is also more than 50% likely to 
reach the right result sitting solo. So, where x = probability of a "right" result (x > 
50%), and y = probability of a "wrong" result (y = 100% - x), then for a three-judge 
panel the probability of a "right" result is given by the formula x3+ 3x2y; for a court 
with nine members, deciding by majority vote, the formula would be x9 + 9x8y + 36x7y2 
+ 84x6y3 + 126x5y4. Thus, if each judge on a three-judge panel has an 80% probability 
of reaching the "right" result sitting alone, then voting together they have an 89.6% 
probability of reaching the correct disposition. This calculation also assumes each judge 
remains independent of the others. A strong-willed judge would affect the outcome 
either way depending on that judge's brilliance or stupidity. 
101. Further, as Evan Caminker points out, this justification may also weaken in 
situations calling for the exercise of equitable discretion. Caminker, supra note 70, at 
849 n.128. He argues that just as the trial court is best suited to judicial fact-finding, 
so it is institutionally best suited to make equitable decisions and to create equitable 
exceptions. His suggestion is, however, only one side of the debate over the adage "hard 
cases make bad law." It may be that trial courts are too close to a case to appreciate 
how an equitable ruling in the case before them could lead to inequitable decisions over 
time. But it also may be that more remote courts simply lack the discipline, imagination 
or flexibility to prevent equitable exceptions from becoming lawless exercises of 
arbitrary will. 
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person, and hence no judge, is above the law. To view judicial 
decisions as products of uncontrolled willfulness on the part of a judge 
would rob those decisions of whatever moral power they have to 
command obedience. Courts have little power to coerce obedience 
directly and so must rely upon the acceptance of their decisions as 
reasoned products of disinterested minds. A dramatic example was the 
State of Georgia's defiance of Worcester v. Georgia, 102 where the 
Supreme Court held that under treaties made by the United States with 
the Native American tribes, certain lands in Georgia desired by white 
settlers belonged to the Cherokees. The decision did nothing to help the 
Cherokees; they were forcibly removed anyway. President Andrew 
Jackson refused to help, reputedly sneering "John Marshall has made his 
decision, now let him enforce it."103 The quote is apocryphal, although 
Jackson was in complete sympathy with the Georgians. But Jackson 
also recognized that federal power was too weak to support the Supreme 
Court's mandate. Without that support, the mandate was worthless: 
"The decision of the supreme court has fell [stillborn], and they find that it 
cannot coerce Georgia to yield to its mandate, and I believe Ridge104 has 
expressed despair, and that it is better for them to treat and move. In this he 
is right, for if orders were issued tomorrow one regiment of militia could not 
be got to march to save them from destruction and this the opposition know, 
and if a collision was to take place between them and the Georgians, the arm 
of the ;overnment is not sufficiently strong to preserve them from destruc-
tion. "10 
102. 31 U.S. (6 Peters) 515 (1832). 
103. GLYNDON G. VANDEUSEN, THE JACKSONIAN ERA 1828-1848, 49 (1959). 
104. Major John Ridge was a leader of the Cherokee party that held out against the 
Georgians. He did indeed "treat" on December 29, 1835, and moved his party west. IV 
CORRESPONDENCE OF ANDREW JACKSON, John Spencer Bassett (ed.) 430 n.2 (editor's 
note) (1929). 
105. Id. at 430. In the 1820s, encouraged by a series of treaties with the United 
States, the Cherokees had established themselves as a farming community in Georgia. 
The treaties guaranteed their sovereignty. When gold was discovered on their land, 
however, the Georgia legislature and Governor Lumpkin quickly enacted statutes which 
renounced the treaties, appropriated the lands, and extended state jurisdiction over all 
Indian lands. One Com Tassels, a Cherokee, committed murder on Indian land. He was 
arrested, tried, and convicted under Georgia law and sentenced to hang. He and the 
Cherokee tribe appealed to the Supreme Court to declare his sentence void because 
under the treaties he should have been tried and punished under tribal law. The Supreme 
Court issued a writ for Governor Lumpkin to show cause why Com Tassel should not 
be released. Lumpkin ignored the writ and had Tassel hanged, which mooted that 
appeal. See Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Peters) 1 (1831). One year 
later, a Congregationalist minister, Samuel Worcester, was sentenced to four years at 
hard labor for failing to obtain a state permit to live on Indian lands. Again, he and the 
Cherokee tribe appealed to the Supreme Court to reverse. This time, the Court was able 
to hear the case and issued an opinion (written by Marshall) and an order nullifying the 
sentence and declaring the above-described statutes unconstitutional. Worcester v. 
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Peters) 515 (1832). Again, the Supreme Court's order was ignored, 
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In general, however, litigants obey court decisions. In large part they 
do so because• such decisions are seen as the product of reasoned 
application of legal rules and not mere politics or personality. Thus, 
"stare decisis" is important not merely because individuals rely on 
precedent to structure their commercial activity but because fidelity to 
precedent is part and parcel of a conception of "the judiciary as a source 
of impersonal and reasoned judgments."106 Maintaining the perception 
that judges reach decisions on the basis of legitimate legal principles, 
that judges are not above the law is, I suggest, a key reason favoring 
stare decisis. 
Another fundamental tenet of American democracy which stare decisis 
supports is the concept of majority rule. The democratic ideal is that the 
legislature makes the laws, the executive carries them out, and the 
judiciary enforces them (unless it finds them unconstitutional). 
However, the reality is that the legislature cannot foresee all contingen-
cies and may deliberately avoid providing even for those it can foresee 
because it is unable to make hard political choices. Consequently, 
statutes are frequently ambiguous. Sometimes the ambiguities are 
resolved by the formulation of administrative rules, but at least as often 
they are resolved by judicial decisions. "[T]he courts, the most 
electorally non-accountable body of government, routinely choose 
between a variety of possible constructions of a legislative act, any one 
of which the legislature could have legitimately chosen."107 By 
following a strict rule of stare decisis with respect to statutory interpreta-
tion, the courts can send a clear signal to Congress that it cannot 
completely abdicate its legislative function: 
Worcester was not released, and the Cherokees were driven out of their lands. See 
Rebecca BROOKS GRUVER, AN AMERICAN HISTORY 370-72 (1972); VAN DEUSEN, supra 
note 103; ADRIENNE SIEGEL, THE MARSHALL COURT 1801-1835 at 175-87 (1987). 
106. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 852 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, supra note 81). See also, Thornburgh v. Am. College 
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 786-87 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) 
(without stare decisis, "deciding cases becomes a mere exercise of judicial will, with 
arbitrary and unpredictable results"); Vasquez v. Hillary, 474 U.S. at 265 (1986) (stare 
decisis "permits society to presume that bedrock principles are founded in the law rather 
than in the proclivities of individuals''). 
107. Lawrence C. Marshall, "Let Congress Do It": The Case for An Absolute Rule 
of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 177, 206 (1989) (advocating strict 
application of stare decisis to decisions construing federal statutes). 
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We have said also that the burden borne by the party advocating the abandon-
ment of an established precedent is greater where the Court is asked to overrule 
a point of statutory construction. Considerations of stare decisis have _special 
force in the area of statutory interpretation, for here, unlike in the context of 
constitutional interpretation, the legislative power is implicated, and Congress 
remains free to alter what we have done. 108 
Thus, by unwavering interpretation of a statute, a court can advance 
an important democratic value. By declining, in effect, to usurp the 
majoritarian norm, it can put the onus on the electorate to direct the 
legislature to correct any "erroneous" interpretation. For example, a 
debate in Congress between two legal rules may lead to statutory 
language which is worded so ambiguously that it could be interpreted to 
support either rule. Congress will be unlikely to succeed in overriding 
whichever rule the judiciary "interprets" the statute to express (because 
otherwise Congress could have chosen the other rule in the first place). 
The electorate, however, assuming it had the requisite knowledge and 
concern about the issue, could instruct or elect representatives to 
"correct" the law if the electorate knew that stare decisis would prevent 
the judiciary from altering its interpretation. Contrariwise, the absence 
of legislative correction does not serve the same majoritarian norms; 
collective silence should not be construed as collective consent to a 
particular interpretation. 109 
In sum, a rule of stare decisis is not itself a democratic rule. It does 
nothing to change the autocratic nature of a judicial decision. But it 
does promote the majoritarian value of democracy indirectly by enabling 
the judiciary to resist the temptation repeatedly to "legislate" on the 
same subject by interpreting and re-interpreting a particular statute. 
The force of this rationale for stare decisis varies with the circum-
stances, as do other rationales. For example, in jurisdictions where the 
judiciary is elected, the rationale may lose considerable force to the 
argument that the judiciary is as answerable to the electorate as the 
legislature, and the judge who advances an unpopular interpretation of 
a statute risks losing the next election. 110 Likewise, the less one 
believes that law and politics can or should be separated, the less 
sensible this rationale becomes. The idea that stare decisis prevents the 
108. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989). 
109. See Marshall, supra note 107, at 193-96 (arguing that democratic legislative 
process is undermined by judicial reliance on Congressional silence or inaction); see also 
William N. Eskridge Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67 (1988). 
110. However, the idea of a judiciary responsive to the electorate, while popular a 
century ago, has fallen out of favor in the past 50 years. See David W. Case, In Search 
of an Independent Judiciary: Alternatives to Judicial Elections in Mississippi, 13 MISS. 
C. L. REV. 1, 10 (1992). 
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usurpation of political powers which properly belong in the legislature 
becomes problematic: since the political predilections of judges already 
pervade their decisions, to follow a prior interpretation of a statute is 
merely to give force to the political will of another judge at an earlier 
time. It is, in effect, to vote the party line-and it does not withdraw 
the judiciary from the realm of the political. 
5. A Constitution or Statute Requires 
Finally, stare decisis may be required by either a constitution or 
statute. For example, when the United States Constitution speaks in 
terms of a "supreme" court and "inferior" courts, it arguably requires 
that all federal courts obey Supreme Court precedent. Article I 
empowers Congress to "constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme 
Court" and Article III provides that "[t]he judicial power of the United 
States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior courts 
as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." Some 
scholars read these clauses as establishing "inferior" courts which are 
subservient to the "supreme" court. 111 Others, however, read the term 
"inferior" as referring to a lesser degree of jurisdictional authority than 
the term "supreme."112 
Even if the Constitution were read as requiring "inferior" federal 
courts to follow Supreme Court precedent, however, the justification 
would extend only from the lower federal courts to the Supreme Court 
and would not speak either to the relationship between lower federal 
111. Caminker, supra note 70, at 828-38. 
112. Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article Ill: Separating The Two 
Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 254-59 (1985) (arguing that the 
Supreme Court is "supreme" because, among other reasons, it is the court of last resort, 
the only court from which no appeal lies); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The 
Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1155, 
1180 n.139 (1992) (suggesting that the terms "inferior" and "supreme" could refer to the 
differing geographical jurisdictions assigned to each tier of courts). My own historical 
study of why the "Supreme" Court of New York is not and has never been the court of 
last resort leads me to conclude that the terms "supreme" and "inferior," without more, 
are as likely to refer to a concept of geographical jurisdiction as a concept of obedience. 
See Bryan T. Camp, Politics and Power in the Court for the Correction of Errors, 
(1988) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Virginia) (on file with author) (discussing 
how the Supreme Court of New York was "supreme" not in the sense that it had the 
final word on what rule of law would prevail, because it most assuredly did not, but 
because its word, until such time as it was reversed by the Court for the Correction of 
Errors, was binding on all lower courts throughout the state). 
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courts themselves (i.e. between trial and appellate courts) or to the 
relationship between state courts and the Supreme Court. 
Likewise, while the Constitution could be said to require state courts 
to follow federal decisions on federal law under the Supremacy Clause, 
it is also arguable that the Judiciary Act of 1789 § 34 (the Federal Rules 
of Decision Act) requires federal courts to apply stare decisis to issues 
of state law decided by state courts. The Rules of Decision Act provides 
that "[t]he laws of the several states, except where the Constitution, 
treaties, or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or 
provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law 
in the court of the United States in cases where they apply."113 
It was certainly argued in early Supreme Court cases that the Supreme 
Court (and other federal courts) must abide by state court precedent on 
state law issues. 114 As is well known, this argument was squashed on 
two grounds in Swift v. Tyson. 115 First, state court decisions were not 
"laws" within the meaning of the Judiciary Act because court decisions 
did not "make" laws but were only evidence of what the law was. 
Second, if state and local court decisions on matters of "general law" 
were binding, that would lead to chaos in the federal system. 116 Swift 
was itself overruled by Erie v. Tompkins, 117 with the interesting 
comment: "[l]f only a question of statutory construction were involved 
we should not be prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied 
throughout nearly a century. But the unconstitutionality of the course 
pursued has now been made clear, and compels us to do so."118 
Thus, it is not too much to say that the Rules of Decisions Act, as 
interpreted since 1938, commands the federal courts to obey the state 
courts of last resort as to issues of state law. In effect, it establishes a 
limited stare decisis rule for federal courts. 
C. Reasons Against Stare Decisis 
Although the above justifications support a rule of stare decisis under 
some circumstances, it does not follow that a rule of stare decisis is 
<lesirable in all situations. As described above; each justification applies 
113. Federal Rules of Decision Act (originally codified at 28 U.S.C. § 725 (1940)) 
(codified as amended, at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1997)) 
114. See, e.g., Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. 367 (1842) (counsel arguing 
that New Jersey Supreme Court precedent interpreting land grant patent should have 
preclusive effect under doctrine of stare decisis). 
115. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, overruled by Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
116. Martin, 41 U.S. 367, at 1. 
117. Erie, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) 
118. Id. at 77-78. For a discussion of the relationship of stare decisis to statutory 
construction, see supra text accompanying note 107. 
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more strongly in some circumstances than in others. In addition, there 
are several reasons why stare decisis may sometimes run counter to other 
worthy legal doctrines and policies. 
1. The Law Will Be Better Developed 
One problem with a strict rule of stare decisis is that it requires 
obedience to the "first out" decision. There is no a priori reason to 
believe that the first decision to come out of an appellate court is any 
better than the second or third decision. In fact, if anything, the intuition 
is that the later decisions will be more valuable and so should be 
accorded more respect. 119 
The United States generally does not follow a "first out" rule. Instead, 
there are two important ways in which the legal systems operating within 
the United States eschew stare decisis in favor of legal diversity and 
non-uniformity, a situation that some (especially civil law students 
learning common law) find distressingly confusing. 
First, the United States is unique among the world's legal systems in 
the degree to which it is a federal system. It contains over fifty non-
federal jurisdictions applying their own local laws, which must be 
respected by the national courts. One cannot expect the laws of over 
fifty jurisdictions to be uniform, and they are not. Far from considering 
it a liability, however, our jurisprudence celebrates this diversity of laws 
and legal regimes. 
Second, the federal courts are structured so that a "first out" decision 
does not necessarily control subsequent decisions. That is, the Supreme 
Court has great discretion in deciding what cases it will take under 
consideration. Rule 10 of the Supreme Court Rules makes it clear that 
a petition for a writ of certiorari "will be granted only when there are 
special and important reasons. therefore." In describing those reasons, 
the Court Rule speaks in terms of conflict. It favors for consideration 
issues over which there are conflicts between and among the courts of 
appeals or state courts of last resort, and cases in which any court's 
decision of a federal question "conflicts with applicable decisions of this 
119. See Julia R. Hathaway, Note, Conflict Resolution Among Panels of the 
Michigan Court of Appeals Under Administrative Order 1994-4, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 
1409 (1995) (arguing against "first out" rule promulgated by Michigan Supreme Court 
requiring intermediate courts of appeals to obey the first panel decision on a subject until 
the rule thereby established is overturned by the Supreme Court). 
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Court." The idea behind this principle is that conflict is good. The 
Court recognizes that the "first out" opinion on any given issue by a 
circuit does not preclude another circuit from deciding differently. 
Conflicting circuit opinions allow legal issues to "percolate," and it may 
be that a legal problem. will work itself out through this process. Far 
from being harmful, a short-term diversity of legal rules may actually 
help the long-term resolution of a legal problem. In this way, a legal 
regime freed from strict stare decisis may actually develop better law if 
orderly change is provided for by other mechanisms. 
2. Judicial Economy and Legitimacy 
To be effective, stare decisis requires that the judge applying the 
doctrine be able to distinguish between dicta and holdings. This is often 
quite hard to do. 120 Adherence to stare decisis thus consumes judicial 
resources as courts try to parse past decisions to discover what is binding 
and what is not. Worse, it consumes judicial resources as judges twist 
precedent to justify the desired results. 121 Either way, stare decisis 
wastes time and effort, and undermines judicial legitimacy if the doctrine 
is observed only in the breach. 
IV. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN STARE DECISIS AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS 
A. Bankruptcy and District Courts Should Be 
Bound by BAP Decisions 
Considering only the ideas behind stare decisis, and putting aside for 
the moment the constitutional concerns involved, I submit that both 
bankruptcy and district courts should be bound by BAP decisions to the 
same extent they are bound by circuit court decisions. 122 Specifically, 
120. Compare Werner, supra note 67, at 642-47 (arguing that the reasoning of the 
court is not part of the court's decision for purposes of stare decisis), with Michael C. 
Dorf, Dicta and Article Ill, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2000-09 (1994) (after collecting 
case law demonstrating significant confusion, arguing that the reasoning of the court is 
integral to the court's decision for purposes of stare decisis). 
121. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S.Ct. 2711, 2742 (1993) 
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (judges "know how to mouth the correct legal rules with 
ironic solemnity while avoiding those rules' logical consequences.") (quotation marks 
and citations omitted); see generally Caminker, supra note 70, at 819-20, (reviewing 
literature documenting state and lower federal courts' attempts to evade Supreme Court 
precedent). 
122. These considerations also lead to the conclusion that horizontal stare decisis 
should apply as between BAP panels as it does between panels of the circuit courts of 
appeal. That has long been the rule in the 9th Circuit BAP. See, e.g., Ball v. Payco-
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the stability, uniformity, and legitimacy justifications support assigning 
BAP decisions the same weight as circuit court opinions. Those courts 
and commentators who have pointed out how the judicial economy and 
efficiency justification does not support a stare decisis rule under the 
current structure are correct in part, but since most of them consider only 
the path-of-review justification, they err in stopping their analysis at that 
point and concluding that stare decisis has no application. Likewise, 
while considerations of federalism as reflected in the Rules of Decision 
Act or the Constitution do not compel stare decisis, nonetheless to the 
extent that the Constitution's provision of uniform rules for bankruptcy 
reflects the American experience under the Articles of Confederation, the 
Constitution reflects a conclusion that bankruptcy law is not an area 
where diversity of the law is valued. Finally, it is unlikely that applying 
stare decisis will produce hypocrisy in the bankruptcy arena any more 
than in other areas of law where the doctrine is well accepted. The 
following sub-sections expand on each of these points in tum. 
1. Stability 
Stability-the consistent application of rules over time-is as 
important in bankruptcy as in any other area of law. Many of 
bankruptcy's legal rules directly affect both pre- and post-petition 
behavior. For example, creditors need to know whether they may retain 
funds before seeking permission to set-off. 123 Likewise, creditors and 
debtors often need to know how to write agreements so that the 
consequences of bankruptcy on the agreements are known and predict-
able.124 Most importantly, bankruptcy trustees need to know the range 
of actions they are permitted or required to take to augment the estate, 
run the business, and satisfy the debtor's creditors. 
While instability in bankruptcy law may result from a variety of 
factors and not simply from bankruptcy judges' refusal to give stare 
decisis effect to district court or BAP decisions, the fact that there are 
General American Credits (In re Ball), 185 B.R. 595 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995) (BAPs will 
adhere to prior BAP opinions unless and until overruled by the Court of Appeals). 
123. See Citizens Bank of Md. v. Strumpf, 116 S.Ct. 286 (1995). 
124. See, e.g., In re General Assoc. Investors Ltd. Partnership, 150 B.R. 756 (Bankr. 
D. Ariz. 1993) (questioning whether, in financing hotel, bank's deed of trust, assignment 
of lease and rents, and financing statement for debtor's resort included as security 
revenue derived from rental of rooms or facilities). 
I 
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316 bankruptcy judgeships makes it considerably more difficult to 
develop legal rules that have staying power. By the same token, the 
situation becomes even less stable when more than 316 judges are 
reviewed by over 649 district judges sitting in ninety-four different 
district courts, none of whom are bound to follow the decisions of the 
others. It is not until one arrives at the circuit court level that order is 
established. 
It is not only the number of judges, but also the intermediate layer of 
review which adds uncertainty over whether anything will be settled. 
For example, in Fiscal Year 1994 (FY94) 837,797 bankruptcy petitions 
were filed, 4,892 appeals were taken to the district courts and 1,382 
appeals were taken to the circuit courts. 125 During FY94, the circuit 
courts disposed of 1,337 cases, 650 on their merits. 126 Interestingly, 
the 1,337 dispositions resulted in 931 reported opinions. 127 Of those 
931 opinions, over one third (336) came from the Ninth Circuit. 
If one assumes that these numbers are also a fair reflection of the 
dynamic picture-that is, that for every 840,000 petitions filed, 
approximately 5,000 will ask for intermediate review and 1,400 will seek 
circuit court review-then one can appreciate how, if the bankruptcy 
judges were answerable directly to the circuits or a BAP in each circuit, 
conflicting decisions over points of bankruptcy law could be harmonized 
far more quickly within each circuit. For example, when a hotel files for 
bankruptcy protection, everyone involved wants to know how to treat 
post-petition room revenues. Secured lenders want those monies treated 
as "rents" within the meaning of Bankruptcy Code section 552 because 
then the revenues will be treated as "cash collateral" under Bankruptcy 
Code section 363(a), and the lenders will be entitled to certain 
protections before the debtor could use the revenues. Naturally, debtors 
want the monies treated as something other than rents. Before 1994, the 
state of the law on this question was "incoherent" in the Ninth Cir-
cuit.128 Although a BAP had held in early 1991that the revenues were 
not rents but money paid on accounts, 129 its decision did not. settle the 
question because of the uncertain _stare ·decisis effect of its opinion.130 
125. 1994 ANN. REP. OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., 
Tables B-1, C-2, and F, respectively .. 
126. Id. Table B-1. , 
127. Per LEXIS search of BKRTCY library, CASES file, searching for "COURT 
(circuit) and DATE (aft September 30, 1993) and DATE (bef October 1, 1994)." Note 
that not all cases reported on LEXIS are considered published precedent. 
128. In re Hotel Sierra Vista Ltd., 112 F.3d 429, 431 n.2 (9th Cir. 1997). 
129. In re Northview Corp., 130 B.R. 543 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991). 
130. Compare In re Thunderbird Inn, 151.B.R. 224 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1993) (bound 
by BAP decision), with In re General Assoc. Investors Ltd. Partnership, 150 B.R. at 756; 
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Until Congress clarified the matter in. the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
1994 to include post-petition room revenues as property within the 
meaning of sections 552 and 363,131 the fact remained that neither 
lenders nor borrowers could predict which rule would obtain, regardless 
of the wording used in the loan security documents ( deeds of trust, 
etc).132 
Accordingly, the stability rationale strongly supports applying stare 
decisis to BAP decisions. As one jurist aptly noted: 
A bankruptcy judge who feels free to disregard Appellate Panel decisions 
deprives every attorney in his or her territory of the ability to predict the 
outcome of a bankruptcy dispute, at least at the trial court level. It is the 
attorneys, and not the judges, which make any legal system work by counseling 
their clients and crafting compromises so that only a small portion of potential 
disputes ever actually come before the judge for adjudication. Published court 
decisions, whether favorable or unfavorable to particular position, are the tools 
a competent lawyer uses in advising his or her clients. The bankruptcy judge 
who refuses to feel bound by Appellate Panel decisions takes this tool away 
from the attorneys and thereby harms the system. 133 
2. Uniformity 
The term "uniformity" in bankruptcy is usually taken to mean 
geographic uniformity, the elimination of differences in the treatment of 
debtors who live in different places. One goal of the current system is 
to give the same fresh start to debtors in California as to debtors in West 
Virginia. The idea is to remedy the problem illustrated by early cases 
in which the resident of one state was not able to gain a true fresh start 
cf In re Everett Home Town Ltd., 146 B.R. 453 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1992) (not bound by 
BAP decision). Although the BAP opinion turned in part on Arizona property law, that 
state's treatment of room revenues is not significantly different from other states' 
treatment. See Northview Corp., 130 B.R. at 543. 
131. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106. 11 
U.S.C.S. §§ 363, 552 (Law. Co-op. 1997). 
132. Note that this is not a situation which parties can contract around. Here, the 
rule really does matter because § 552 is one of those bankruptcy provisions which alter 
contractual arrangements. See, e.g., In re Thunderbird Inn, 151 B.R. at 225 (court 
assuming that the trust deed contained language sufficient to bring room revenues within 
the meaning of the parties' security agreement but nonetheless finding that, based on In 
re Northview Corp., 130 B.R. at 543, the lender's interest in post-petition room revenues 
was cut off by section 552(a), the room revenues were not "cash collateral" within the 
meaning of Bankruptcy Code section 363(a), and therefore the lender was not entitled 
to adequate protection from debtor's use of the revenues). 
133. In re Muskin Inc., 151 B.R. 252, 255 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1993). 
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because that state's insolvency laws could not affect contracts made or 
obligations incurred in other states. 134 Even with the extension of the 
national bankruptcy laws to debtors of all sorts-businesses and 
municipalities, as well as individual consumers-the application of a 
"uniform" rule to diverse regimes of state property law has results that 
are not uniform. Thus, the lack of uniformity in bankruptcy law, even 
more than the lack of stability, is due not only to the failure of 
bankruptcy judges to be bound by the BAPs, but is also caused by the 
interplay of varying state law regimes with the Bankruptcy Code. 135 
Reducing the number of decision-makers, however, would help reduce 
the divergence of opinions and help establish uniform treatment of 
debtors, just as it would increase stability. For example, consider the 
proper interpretation of Bankruptcy Code section 523(a)(l)(C), which 
prevents a debtor from receiving a discharge for otherwise dischargeable 
tax liabilities that the debtor "willfully attempted in any manner to evade 
or defeat." The question is under what standard a debtor should be held 
to have "willfully attempted." For over ten years courts struggled to 
find a common standard of proof of willfulness. Some required proof 
that measured up to the standard used in the criminal statute for felony 
tax evasion. 136 Others adopted the more lenient civil standard of 
willfulness, achieving opposite results on similar facts. 137 
The difference in standards leads to a difference in treatment. It is 
universally acknowledged that "the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is 
to allow the honest debtor a fresh start."138 But the choice of standard 
can determine who does and does not fall within the category of "honest 
debtors." For example, the bankruptcy court in In re Toti used the 
criminal standard of willfulness to find the debtor honest, but was 
134. E.g., Cook v. Moffat, 46 U.S. 295 (1847) (Maryland consumer debtor unable 
to escape obligations to New York merchant because the discharge given under 
Maryland law was ineffective as to the obligation incurred in New York). 
135. One obvious example of this is seen in Bankruptcy Code § 522, which allows 
a debtor to exempt out of the bankruptcy estate property that "is exempt under . . . State 
or local law." Id. Thus, while all states may allow a debtor a homestead exemption, 
some states (such as Texas) place no cap on the value such exemption may have, 
whereas other states (such as Virginia) limit the value of the homestead exemption (as 
does the available federal exemption provision in Bankruptcy Code § 522(d)). 
136. See I.RC § 7201. See e.g., In re Gathwright, 102 B.R. 211 (Bankr. D. Or. 
1989) (debtor's conduct in filing late returns and understating income not sufficient to 
show willful intent to evade payment of taxes; court refused to consider proof of evasion 
of payment). 
137. See, e.g., In re Berzon, 145 B.R. 247; 252 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992) (debtor's 
conduct in filing late returns and understating income sufficient to show a willful attempt 
to evade payment of taxes); see also In re Harris, 49 B.R. 223 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1985) 
modified on reconsideration 59 B.R. 545 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1986). 
138. In re Toti, 24 F.3d 806, 809 (6th Cir. 1994). 
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reversed by the district and appellate courts, who decided that debtor 
honesty should be measured by the civil standard. 139 Beginning with 
the appellate opinion in Toti, courts appear to have reached a consensus 
that although "Congress did not intend that a failure to pay taxes, 
without more, should result in the nondischargeablility of a debtor's tax 
liabilities in bankruptcy,"140 the government must nonetheless prove 
only that the debtor's actions were voluntary, conscious and intentional, 
(as opposed to accidental), which is the civil standard of willfulness used 
in such statutes as I.RC. § 6672 (the Trust Fund Recovery Penalty). 141 
If BAP decisions were binding on all courts within a circuit, greater 
uniformity would be achieved more quickly because the number of 
decision makers would be reduced. Debtors would be less subject to 
disparate treatment at the trial court level. Like the goal of stability, the 
goal of uniformity supports giving circuit-wide stare decisis effect to 
BAP opinions._ 
3. Judicial Economy and Efficiency 
The BAP is a three-judge panel which is established primarily to 
review cases for errors of law. As such, it plays an identical role to the 
circuit courts and possesses identical virtues of economy and efficiency: 
it is a specialized tribunal with three brains at work and all parties 
focused on the legal questions. To this extent, the judicial economy 
rationale supports making BAP decisions binding on both bankruptcy 
and district judges, who are institutionally less able to give thoughtful 
consideration to the legal issues than appellate judges.142 Moreover, 
the current side-by-side system is widely viewed as incompetent to 
139. In re Toti, 141 B.R. 126 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1992), rev'd U.S. v. Toti, 149 
B.R. 829 (E.D. Mich. 1993), aff'd In re Toti, 24 F.3d 806 (6th Cir. 1994). 
140. In re Haas, 48 F.3d 1153, 1157 (11th Cir. 1995). 
141. See In re Birkenstock, 87 F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 1996); Dalton v. IRS, 77 F.3d 
1297, 1302 (10th Cir. 1996) (following Toti); Matter of Bruner, 55 F.3d 195, 200 (5th 
Cir. 1995) (agreeing with Toti); see also In re Sumpter, 64 F.3d 663, 76 A.F.T.R.2d (P-
H) 95-6408 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that the words "in any manner" are broad enough 
to encompass attempts, whether or not successful, to thwart the payment of taxes). 
142. In re Muskin, 151 B.R. 252, 254-55 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1993) ("Ego aside, there 
is no good reason why a bankruptcy judge should want to spend hours struggling with 
a complicated and thorny issue when three other bankruptcy judges have already done 
the same thing, reached a conclusion, and published a decision for the benefit of all."). 
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provide "the desired certainty of outcome."143 As the examples given 
above suggest, according circuit-wide binding effect to BAP decisions 
would not only provide greater certainty and uniformity, but also 
increase judicial efficiency by speeding the resolution of controversial 
issues that might otherwise spend far longer "percolating" among the 
bankruptcy and district courts before being addressed by one or more 
circuit courts. 
Undercutting these efficiency arguments, however, is the fact that the 
BAPs do not necessarily lie in the path of review from bankruptcy 
courts. One cannot predict that an appeal will go to a BAP. The fact 
that there is no horizontal stare decisis between district judges adds even 
more uncertainty to the outcome of an appeal. Therefore, according 
stare decisis effect to BAP decisions will not necessarily reduce the 
numbers of appeals taken, especially to the district courts. This is the 
main argument that both Bankruptcy courts and commentators have used 
to justify failures to follow district court and BAP decisions. 144 Since 
bankruptcy judges do not know at the time they make a decision whether 
it will be a BAP or a district court that will hear any appeal, and since 
no district court has so far considered itself bound by a BAP, it is no 
surprise that many bankruptcy judges feel free to disregard BAP 
decisions.145 
As I have tried to show, however, the fact that another court will be 
able to reverse a judge is not the only reason for that judge to give 
binding effect to that court's decisions .. There are many other rea-
1sons-including reasons· of efficiency The lack of a path-of-review 
justification, which itself is only part of the larger judicial efficiency 
143. See Life Ins. Co. of Va. v. Barakat (In re Barakat), 173 B.R. 672, 679 (Bankr. 
C.D. Cal. 1994) (noting that if district judges can ignore BAP interpretations in the same 
way that one circuit court of appeals "respectfully disagrees" with another circuit court 
of appeals, then "litigants never know what the binding interpretation of the law will be" 
until the court of appeals in that circuit resolves the conflict). See also NBRC Final 
Report, supra note 6, at 765 (under current view that BAP opinions cannot create 
binding precedent, "BAPs may actually accelerate the divergence of views on various 
legal questions"). · · 
144. See, e.g., March & Obregon, supra note 5; First of Amer. Bank v. Gaylord (In 
re Gaylor), 123 B.R. 236, 242 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1991). One can expect this argument 
to be made even more forcefully in those circuits, such as the Second Circuit, where 
BAPs have been adopted by only some of the judicial districts. 
145. See State of Or. Higher Educ. Assistance Found. v. Selden (In re Selden), 121 
B.R. 59 (D. Or. 1990) (using path-of-review rationale to hold that BAP opinion in case 
arising from Central District of California was not binding on bankruptcy court in 
District of Oregon). But see Life Ins. Co. of Va. v. Barakat (In re Barakat), 173 B.R. 
672 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1994) (holding BAP decision binding circuit-wide despite path-of-
review rationale because "there is no reason that both the BAP and the district court 
appellate decisions must have identical [e]ffect, authority, or jurisdiction"). 
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rationale for stare decisis, is not sufficient cause to reject the doctrine's 
application to BAP decisions without examining the extent to which 
other justifications apply. Moreover, if district courts were bound by 
BAP decisions, the lack of direct review of district court opinions by 
BAPs would be of even less importance. I discuss this intriguing 
possibility in Part IV. 
4. Judicial Legitimacy 
By refusing to accord stare decisis effect to BAP decisions, bankruptcy 
courts impair their legitimacy "as a source of impersonal and reasoned 
judgments."146 One bankruptcy judge chastised his colleagues for 
doing so: 
[I]t is in my opinion wrong, and in some sense shameful, for a bankruptcy 
judge to feel free to disregard an Appellate Panel decision in the absence of a 
conflicting ruling by the district court. When a bankruptcy judge disregards an 
Appellate Panel decision on his or her own, merely because he or she disagrees 
with it, that bankruptcy judge is letting his or her ego interfere with the system 
itself.147 
The self-restraint problem can be especially acute in areas of the law, 
such as bankruptcy, where the process is seen as primarily equitable in 
scope. Bankruptcy judges are called upon to do equity between 
competing concerns, constantly balancing the debtor's interest in a fresh 
start with the creditors' interest in fair treatment. 148 While the problem 
146. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 852 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
147. In re Muskin, 151 B.R. at 254 (Jaroslovsky, J.). Judge Jaroslovsky's 
enthusiasm for stare decisis was sorely tested in a later case, Stokes v. Vierra, 173 B.R. 
417, 418 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1994), remanded 185 B.R. 341 (N.D. Cal. 1995), where the 
judge reluctantly decided he was bound to follow a BAP opinion (a 2-1 panel split, no 
less) with which he strongly disagreed. The district court did not express an opinion on 
the stare decisis question, however, because it did not think the bankruptcy court had 
read the BAP opinion correctly; it remanded the case for further proceedings in light of 
its interpretation of the BAP opinion. 
148. In fact, at least one circuit has held that it is precisely the equitable nature of 
the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction which, when a creditor files a claim before the 
bankruptcy court, destroys that creditor's "right to adjudicate before a jury any issue that 
bears directly on the allowance of that claim." Germain v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 988 
F.2d 1323, 1329 (2d Cir. 1993) ("It is reasonable that a creditor or debtor who submits 
to the equity jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court thereby waives any right to a jury trial 
for the resolution of disputes vital to the bankruptcy process . . . and does so not so 
much on a theory of waiver as on the theory that the legal issue has been converted to 
an issue of equity."). 
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in today's world is often thought to be that bankruptcy judges are too 
pro-debtor, they have not always been so. A prominent jurist of the last 
century expressed a very different sentiment: 
I would go to any length, short of doing violence to the plainly expressed will 
of the legislature, in so construing a [bankruptcy] statute as not to give the least 
countenance to that lax morality in relation to the payment of debts which is 
now beginning to disgrace sovereign States, as well as individuals and private 
corporations. 1 
Precisely because judges are subject to human passions and prejudices, 
stare decisis provides a mechanism to limit the extent to which each 
judge imposes his or her own moral vision, whether pro-debtor or pro-
creditor, on the bankruptcy world. 
B. Of Round Holes and Square Pegs: 
The Constitutional Problem 
The Supreme Court thought that the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 
violated the separation of powers doctrine. The gist of the plurality's 
opinion in Marathon was that 
28 U.S.C. § 1471 ... has impermissibly removed most, if not all, of the 
essential attributes of the judicial power from the Art. III district court, and has 
vested those attributes in a non-Art. III adjunct. Such a grant of jurisdiction 
cannot be sustained as an exercise of Congress' power to create adjuncts to Art. 
III courts.150 
I submit that, strictly from an examination of the various justifications 
for stare decisis, it follows clearly that BAP decisions should be binding 
on all bankruptcy courts within a circuit. Since both BAPs and 
bankruptcy courts are composed of the same judges appointed under 
Article I, there is little constitutional concern about that idea-a round 
peg fits into a round hole. It is also clear, as I hope I have shown, 
purely from what would best promote the ideas behind stare decisis, that 
the BAP decisions should be binding on the district courts. However, 
round pegs fit square holes only poorly: there might be constitutional 
concerns about requiring district court Article III judges to obey legal 
rulings issued by Article I judges. If BAP decisions were binding on 
district courts, then district courts would be in the uncomfortable 
position of having to defer to one set of Article I courts (the BAPs) on 
the law and to another set of Article I courts (the bankruptcy courts) on 
the facts (as to core matters, at least). At first blush, this would seem 
to raise the same problems that concerned the Marathon court. The 
149. Stone v. Green, 4 Hill 469 (N.Y. 1842) (Bronson, J.). 
150. Marathon, supra note 8, at 87. 
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Ninth Circuit certainly thought so in Bank of Maui v. Estate Analysis: 
"On the other hand, it must be conceded that BAP decisions cannot bind 
the district courts themselves. As article III courts, the district courts 
must always be free to decline to follow BAP decisions and to formulate 
their own rules within their jurisdiction."151 
However, a closer look at what concerned the Marathon court suggests 
that BAP decisions may indeed be able to bind district courts, even 
under the current structure, without off ending the constitution. The issue 
in Marathon was whether an Article I trial court could, because its 
decision was subject to review of the law by an Article III court, be 
permitted to adjudicate a purely state law claim. Here, in contrast, the 
issue is whether an Article I appellate court can, without violating the 
constitutionally protected separation of powers, create binding legal rules 
to which an Article III court must apply the facts, whether those facts 
were found by the bankruptcy court or by the district court acting in its 
capacity as a trial court. A close examination of the relationship 
between bankruptcy trial courts and BAPs supports the argument that 
BAPs may constitutionally create legal rules that are binding on at least 
those district courts in a circuit which have consented to BAP review (a 
weak assertion of stare decisis effect), and possibly on all district courts 
in a circuit (the strong assertion of stare decisis effect that would be the 
more desirable rule). The constitutionality of both assertions of the stare 
decisis effect rests upon the argument that BAPs depend for their 
existence upon the Article III courts which create them. Ultimately the 
situation reduces to Article III courts binding Article III courts. 152 
The weak assertion relies on the requirement of district court consent. 
Recall that the BAFJA made two critical changes to the BAP structure: 
151. 904 F.2d 470, 472 (9th Cir. 1990) 
152. Coyne v. Westinghouse Credit Corp. (In re Globe Illumination Co.), 149 B.R. 
614 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1993). While I believe that Rigoberto Obregon is correct that 
Judge Bufford's conclusion that BAPs are adjuncts of the circuit courts is wrong, see 
Rigoberto V. Obregon, In re Globe Illumination Co.: A Provocative But Flawed Theory 
on the Precedential Value of BAP Authority, 21 CAL. BANKR. J. 45 (1993), Obregon 
does not, in my view, give adequate weight to the difference between the institutional 
function of the BAP as an appellate tribunal and the bankruptcy court as a trial tribunal. 
That is indeed a distinction with a difference; just because the BAPs are not "true" 
adjuncts of the circuit courts as they were supposed to be under the compromise 
legislation offered by the House prior to the enactment of the BRA, it does not follow 
that the BAPs do not perform the same institutional function-to say what the law is. 
That is quite different from a trial court's function-to find the facts and apply the law 
to them. 
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first, that the parties must consent to BAP jurisdiction and, second, that 
the district courts must have voted to allow a BAP to operate. To the 
extent that the constitutional legitimacy of the BAP under the current 
structure depends upon district court consent, then it does no constitu-
tional violence for BAP decisions to bind those districts which have 
accepted BAPs review. 
The reasoning behind the strong assertion of stare decisis effect is that 
BAPs do not remove the "essence of judicial power" from either the 
district or circuit courts. As far as district courts are concerned, the 
"essence of judicial power" is the power to find the facts at trial. The 
undermining of that power is what the Supreme Court found unconstitu-
tional about the BRA in Marathon; and that is what the constitutional 
debate over the structure of the bankruptcy system has continued to be 
about. Specifically, the Supreme Court has said that, regardless of an 
issue's classification as core or non-core, if the issue presents a 
controversy which entitles the litigants to resolution by a jury trial, the 
Bankruptcy Code cannot operate to deprive the litigants of that right.153 
However, the question that Marathon left open and lower courts have 
not yet resolved, is whether bankruptcy courts are either statutorily 
empowered or constitutionally able to conduct jury trials. 154 This 
controversy demonstrates that concerns about the separation of powers 
are highest at the fact-finding level. The essence of judicial power at 
that level is the control of the fact-finding process. The BAPs do not 
remove the fact-finding function from the district courts. Under the 
current structure, they are never even in the position of reviewing district 
courts' findings of fact. 
Nor do the BAPs impermissibly interfere with the circuit courts' 
function. The essence of judicial power at the appellate level is the 
power to ascertain the law. As Chief Justice Marshall put it, the 
function of the reviewing court is "to say what the law is."155 The 
BAPs do not remove this power of interpretation from the circuits. A 
BAP is a creation of the circuit court; its judges are appointed by the 
circuit court; and its decision in. any given case is fully reviewable by 
the circuit court, should the parties appeal. 
Thus, for BAPs to play the role of a corrector of legal errors should 
not trigger separation of powers concerns about either district or circuit 
courts. BAP decisions may, without offending the Constitution, bind 
153. Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989). 
154. Compare Ben Cooper, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of Pa. (In re Ben Cooper), 896 
F.2d 1394, 1403 (2d Cir. 1990) (yes to both), with Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Frates, (In re 
Kaiser Steel Corp.), 911 F.2d 380, 389 (10th Cir. 1990) (no to the first). 
155. See Briney v. Burley (In re Burley), 738 F.2d 981, 986 (9th Cir. 1984). 
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both bankruptcy and district courts. To implement such a stare decisis 
regime the circuit court would have to announce and implement the rule, 
either through administrative action or through case law. Such action 
would not violate the separation of powers doctrine under the current 
statutory scheme because, first, there is no practical danger of Congres-
sional or Executive manipulation of the legal rules in any particular case 
and, second, it would be entirely appropriate in principle for Congress, 
should it not like the legal rules concerning bankruptcy established by 
the courts, to change those rules pursuant to its Article I mandate to 
create uniform bankruptcy rules.156 In fact, under the current structure, 
since BAPs do not review any district court decisions, there would be no 
danger of BAPs reversing district courts on application of law to facts 
in any specific case. 157 
V. AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE CURRENT STRUCTURE 
The reasons behind stare decisis support making BAP decisions 
binding on both bankruptcy and district courts. That BAPs should bind 
bankruptcy courts causes no constitutional concern. However, the idea 
of BAPs binding district courts will surely generate concerns that have 
political, if not constitutional legitimacy. District judges may resist a 
perceived reduction in their power, just as they have resisted the dilution 
of their positions by the creation of Article III bankruptcy courts.158 
The obvious theoretical solution is for Congress to scrap the current 
Rube Goldberg bankruptcy appellate structure, establish bankruptcy 
156. As discussed supra notes 128-132. and accompanying text, this is precisely 
what Congress did in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 as to the hotel room revenue 
problem. Of course, in that example, the courts did not come up with a uniform or 
stable rule and Congress stepped in. But the point is that no constitutional difference 
exists between an Article III court being bound by a BAP-created legal rule that room 
revenues were "cash collateral" or the same rule written in the statute by Congress. 
157. However, since BAPs create legal rules in the context of deciding specific 
cases and do not "say what the law is" in the same way administrative agencies 
promulgate interpretative regulations, I doubt that an argument could be constructed that 
BAP conclusions of law should be binding for exactly the same reasons agencies' 
regulations are binding. 
158. Nor is it entirely clear that bankruptcy judges want Article III status. See New 
NCBJ President Officer Views on Consumer Filings, Chapter 12, BAPs, AM. BANKR. 
INST. J., Oct. 1996, at 7-8 ("It is my belief that if you took a poll of all 325 bankruptcy 
judges and asked them about it, it would be about 80/20 saying 'Thank you, no.' [to 
becoming Article III judges]"). 
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courts as Article III courts and provide for a single appeal as of right to 
an appellate tribunal. Many commentators agree on that much, though 
specifics differ. Some have proposed routing all bankruptcy appeals to 
a single Article III appellate court with national jurisdiction; others 
suggest routing them tthrough an already existing tribunal like the 
Federal Circuit. 159 Others argue against a specialized tribunal, fearing 
that the loss of a generalist supervisory court would result in inferior 
"law declaration."160 The National Bankruptcy Review Commission 
has thrown its considerable weight behind the idea that all appeals 
should go directly from bankruptcy courts to the existing Circuit 
Courts. 161 For the following reasons, I offer an idea which resonates' 
with those who favor a specialized review court: make the BAPs true 
adjuncts of the circuit courts-just as bankruptcy courts are adjuncts of 
the district courts-and do so regardless of whether Congress decides to 
give bankruptcy judges Article III status. 
Although the legislative history of the BAP provisions is sparse, one 
of the more intriguing recommendations made in 1973 by the Commis-
sion on the Bankruptcy Laws to Congress was to disallow appeals 
directly from the bankruptcy courts to the circuit courts. This recom-
mendation should be given renewed consideration. Much of bankruptcy 
work is equitable in nature. As suggested above, the ideas behind stare 
decisis do not apply as well to issues which center on equitable 
determinations (the application of broad standards) as they do to issues 
centered on application of legal rules. Quite to the contrary, courts 
reviewing controversies in equity routinely defer to the courts who are 
closest to the action. Thus, although the Commission's concern was that 
the physical "remoteness" of the courts of appeals would discourage 
appeals, 162 it is also true that a circuit court's "remoteness" from the 
day-to-day concerns of the bankruptcy world may detract from the 
quality and sensitivity of its review. 
The BAPs are a commendable compromise between a reviewing court 
that is "too remote" and a trial court that is "too close to the action." 
On the one hand, the bankruptcy judges who comprise a BAP are well 
159. See Nathan B. Feinstein, The Bankruptcy System: Proposal to Restructure The 
Bankruptcy Court and Bankruptcy Appellate Processes, in 1995-1996 ANNUAL SURVEY 
OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 517 (William J. Norton, Jr., ed., 1995); Daniel J. Bussel, Power, 
Authority, and Precedent in Interpreting the Bankruptcy Code, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1063 
(1994). 
160. See Paul M. Baisier & David G. Epstein, Resolving Still Unresolved Issues of 
Bankruptcy Law: A Fence or An Ambulance, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 525, 537-39 (1995). 
161. NBRC Final Report, supra note 6, at 752. 
162. See Report of the Commission of the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, 
H.R. Doc. No. 95-137, at 96 (1973). 
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aware of the actual, practical impact of its legal decisions at the trial and 
administrative level. On the other hand, a BAP has the inst.itutional 
advantages of an appeals court: its judges sit as colleagues in a panel of 
three; they are adequately briefed on the legal issues; and they are free 
from the distraction of having to manage the bankruptcy case itself. The 
conclusion of the only study of the BAP work product was that "the 
Panels are generally well-regarded by Ninth Circuit attorneys with 
bankruptcy appellate experience. The attorneys respond particularly 
favorably to procedural and qualitative aspects of the Panels' opera-
tions."163 If possible, the BAPs should be retained because they are 
a good idea. 
The NBRC proposes to eliminate the BAPs because it associates the 
BAPs with a two-tiered appellate system and cannot conceive of a role 
for BAPs in a single-tiered system.164 That is, the NBRC's chief 
concern is that an intermediate level of appeal is one bite too many; it 
causes litigants delay and expense without adding value to the system. 
Few would dispute that point. As I hope I have shown, however, such 
a flaw does not inhere in a two-tiered appellate scheme. If BAP 
opinions are given binding effect throughout the circuit, many of the ill-
effects described by the NBRC would be ameliorated. More important-
ly, it does not necessarily follow that in order to eliminate intermediate 
appeals one must also eliminate the BAPs. I suggest that the BAPs 
could be retained while intermediate appellate review was eliminated, so 
that litigants get only one appeal as of right. All that would require is 
that Judge Bufford's analysis of BAPs as adjuncts to the circuit courts 
in In re Globe Illumination became reality.165 
The idea is to assume that bankruptcy courts retain Article I status, 
and that district courts retain their close supervisory powers and their 
ability to remove any matter from the bankruptcy courts' consideration. 
Then, in each circuit a Bankruptcy Appellate Service ("BAS") could be 
created as an adjunct to the circuit courts. Its judges would be appointed 
by the circuit court from among the active bankruptcy judges. From the 
BAS, three-member panels of bankruptcy judges (still "BAPs") would 
be drawn. Appeals from the decisions of the trial court ( either a 
163. Bermant & Sloan, supra note 59, at 217. 
164. NBRC Final Report, supra note 6, at 764-67 (analyzing BAPs as part of the 
problems posed by intermediate review). 
165. See supra note 152. 
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bankruptcy court deciding a core matter, or a district court that had 
either withdrawn the reference or reviewed a non-core matter) would go 
directly to the circuit level. There would be no district court review and 
no intermediate level of review as of right. At the discretion of the 
circuit, an appeal could then be referred to a BAP, or not. Circuits 
could choose the extent to which referrals were to be made; they could 
create automatic referrals, perhaps for all core matters, while they 
retained the power in any given case to withdraw the reference at any 
time. (In this, their procedure would be similar to the handling of 
referrals by the district courts.) A litigant seeking to reverse any adverse 
BAP decision could be permitted to petition the circuit court for a writ 
of certiorari. The circuit would have discretion to accept or deny 
review. However, where the BAP certified that its decision created a 
conflict with another circuit, circuit review could be mandatory. In cases 
where review was denied or its outcome unfavorable, the litigant could 
then petition the Supreme Court for review as under current practice. 
Under this scheme, the BAPs would be adjuncts to the circuit courts, 
but would retain their Article I status. The terms of bankruptcy judges 
appointed by the circuits would still be limited and their salaries would 
have no constitutional protection against diminution.166 The Article I 
character of the BAS, however, ought not to raise separation of powers 
concerns. To begin with, such concerns are far weaker at the appellate 
level than at the trial level, as seen in the review of post-Marathon case 
law above. As a practical matter, it is difficult to find a separation of 
powers objection to the arrangement: the BAS would be well insulated 
from either legislative or administrative pressures. Nor would there be 
a theoretical breach: the circuit courts would retain ultimate power to say 
what the law is. Moreover, the history surrounding the adoption of the 
Constitution also suggests that such an arrangement would not 
impermissibly blend constitutional powers. As mentioned above, the 
idea of separation of powers was of great concern to those who wrote 
the Constitution. James Madison devoted a series of the Federalist 
essays "to investigate the sense in which the preservation of liberty 
requires that the three great departments of power should be separate and 
distinct."167 In that series, Madison reviewed to what extent the state 
constitutions of the time addressed the separation of powers issue. For 
example, Madison concluded that New York's state Constitution made 
166. One provision of each judge's employment contract could be that no reduction 
in salary could take place during the appointment. While this would not suffice to make 
bankruptcy courts Article III courts, it would reduce concern that this scheme encroaches 
on the judicial sphere of action. 
167. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
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"no declaration on this subject, but appears very clearly to have been 
framed with an eye to the danger of improperly blending the different 
departments."168 Madison reached this conclusion even though the 
court of last resort in New York, at that time called the Court for the 
Trial of Impeachments and Correction of Error (CCE), was composed of 
the three justices of the Supreme Court, the Chancellor, and the entire 
thirty-two members of the New York senate. This court existed for the 
first seventy years of the Republic; it was abolished in 1846. It 
produced a substantial body of law, some of which is. good law even 
today. 169 One reason why Madison and others would not have been 
concerned about this .arrangement is that the CCE was not set up to try 
cases. Its function, as its title implies, was merely to correct errors made 
by courts (such as the New York Supreme Court) in trying cases. Its 
purpose was to address and settle only those cases "presenting great and 
novel questions which will occasionally arise under any judicial system, 
where the ordinary courts after the fullest argument and scrutiny fail to 
satisfy the public or the parties in interest."170 In short, it performed 
solely an appellate legal error correction function. Its decisions were 
binding on both the Supreme Court (and all lower courts of law) as well 
as on the Chancellor and Vice-Chancellors (the courts of equity). The 
CCE's function as an appellate court triggered separation of powers 
concerns only when it became embroiled in a series of constitutional 
controversies, at which time the difficulty of having the same people 
who had enacted a statute pass upon its constitutionality became 
apparent. 171 No such concern is raised by making the BAPs adjuncts 
to the circuit. courts. As outlined above, such an action would not 
remove the essence of the circuit courts' power to determine the law. 
168. Id. at 305. 
169. For example, Dyett v. Pendleton, 8 Cow. 727 (N.Y. 1826) was discussed in at 
least one first-year property casebook as a leading case on constructive eviction as of 
1984. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, REAL PROPERTY (1984). 
170. Charles O'Connor, in REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, 
697 (William G. Bishop & William H. Attree, eds.) (The Evening Atlas 1846). 
171. See generally Camp, supra note 112. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The reasons behind the stare decisis doctrine strongly support both 
bankruptcy courts and district courts giving full precedential effect to 
BAP decisions. Under the current structure, it is clear that circuit courts 
could take administrative action to require this result for bankruptcy 
courts. While the power of the circuit courts to implement such a rule 
for district courts admits of doubt, there is nonetheless a respectable 
argument for the constitutional soundness of a circuit court rule requiring 
district courts to obey legal rules established by BAP decisions. To the 
extent that the system can be reformed, rules permitting two appeals as 
of right from a trial decision should be abolished and BAPs should be 
reformed as circuit court adjuncts. If bankruptcy court judges are given 
Article III status, then no constitutional concern arises from any type of 
review structure. However, the potential political problems facing such 
reform are considerable. An alternative is the idea of creating a 
Bankruptcy Appellate Service and making BAPs adjuncts to the circuit 
courts. Even as Article I courts, the BAPs could then continue to 
contribute to the development of bankruptcy law without running afoul 
of the constitutional command to reserve the essence of judicial power 
to Article III courts. 
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